Sync with 2.32.4

Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
This commit is contained in:
Taylor Blau
2022-10-06 17:42:02 -04:00
63 changed files with 291 additions and 60 deletions

34
shell.c
View File

@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ static void cd_to_homedir(void)
die("could not chdir to user's home directory");
}
#define MAX_INTERACTIVE_COMMAND (4*1024*1024)
static void run_shell(void)
{
int done = 0;
@@ -67,22 +69,46 @@ static void run_shell(void)
run_command_v_opt(help_argv, RUN_SILENT_EXEC_FAILURE);
do {
struct strbuf line = STRBUF_INIT;
const char *prog;
char *full_cmd;
char *rawargs;
size_t len;
char *split_args;
const char **argv;
int code;
int count;
fprintf(stderr, "git> ");
if (git_read_line_interactively(&line) == EOF) {
/*
* Avoid using a strbuf or git_read_line_interactively() here.
* We don't want to allocate arbitrary amounts of memory on
* behalf of a possibly untrusted client, and we're subject to
* OS limits on command length anyway.
*/
fflush(stdout);
rawargs = xmalloc(MAX_INTERACTIVE_COMMAND);
if (!fgets(rawargs, MAX_INTERACTIVE_COMMAND, stdin)) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
strbuf_release(&line);
free(rawargs);
break;
}
rawargs = strbuf_detach(&line, NULL);
len = strlen(rawargs);
/*
* If we truncated due to our input buffer size, reject the
* command. That's better than running bogus input, and
* there's a good chance it's just malicious garbage anyway.
*/
if (len >= MAX_INTERACTIVE_COMMAND - 1)
die("invalid command format: input too long");
if (len > 0 && rawargs[len - 1] == '\n') {
if (--len > 0 && rawargs[len - 1] == '\r')
--len;
rawargs[len] = '\0';
}
split_args = xstrdup(rawargs);
count = split_cmdline(split_args, &argv);
if (count < 0) {