diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
index 88a6de62d532..c30f5a70bd18 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -2191,21 +2191,6 @@ static void report_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, enum ptrace_syscall_dir dir)
 	}
 }
 
-static void update_syscall_orig_x0_after_ptrace(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
-	/*
-	 * Keep orig_x0 authoritative so that seccomp (via
-	 * syscall_get_arguments()), audit and the restart path all see the same
-	 * first argument the syscall is dispatched with, even if it has been
-	 * updated by a tracer. Skip this for NO_SYSCALL (set either by the user
-	 * or the tracer), as regs[0] holds the return value (see the comment in
-	 * el0_svc_common()) and can be unwound using syscall_rollback().
-	 * For compat tasks, orig_r0 is provided directly through GPR index 17.
-	 */
-	if (!is_compat_task() && regs->syscallno != NO_SYSCALL)
-		regs->orig_x0 = regs->regs[0];
-}
-
 int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	unsigned long flags = read_thread_flags();
@@ -2214,26 +2199,12 @@ int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		report_syscall(regs, PTRACE_SYSCALL_ENTER);
 		if (flags & _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
 			return NO_SYSCALL;
-
-		/*
-		 * Ensure ptrace changes to x0 during a regular
-		 * syscall-enter-stop (PTRACE_SYSCALL) are visible to
-		 * subsequent seccomp checks, tracepoints and audit.
-		 */
-		update_syscall_orig_x0_after_ptrace(regs);
 	}
 
 	/* Do the secure computing after ptrace; failures should be fast. */
 	if (secure_computing() == -1)
 		return NO_SYSCALL;
 
-	/*
-	 * Ensure tracer changes to x0 during seccomp ptrace exit
-	 * processing (SECCOMP_RET_TRACE) are visible to tracepoints and
-	 * audit.
-	 */
-	update_syscall_orig_x0_after_ptrace(regs);
-
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))
 		trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->syscallno);