For any changes of struct fd representation we need to
turn existing accesses to fields into calls of wrappers.
Accesses to struct fd::flags are very few (3 in linux/file.h,
1 in net/socket.c, 3 in fs/overlayfs/file.c and 3 more in
explicit initializers).
Those can be dealt with in the commit converting to
new layout; accesses to struct fd::file are too many for that.
This commit converts (almost) all of f.file to
fd_file(f). It's not entirely mechanical ('file' is used as
a member name more than just in struct fd) and it does not
even attempt to distinguish the uses in pointer context from
those in boolean context; the latter will be eventually turned
into a separate helper (fd_empty()).
NOTE: mass conversion to fd_empty(), tempting as it
might be, is a bad idea; better do that piecewise in commit
that convert from fdget...() to CLASS(...).
[conflicts in fs/fhandle.c, kernel/bpf/syscall.c, mm/memcontrol.c
caught by git; fs/stat.c one got caught by git grep]
[fs/xattr.c conflict]
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
As Linus suggested this enables pidfs unconditionally. A key property to
retain is the ability to compare pidfds by inode number (cf. [1]).
That's extremely helpful just as comparing namespace file descriptors by
inode number is. They are used in a variety of scenarios where they need
to be compared, e.g., when receiving a pidfd via SO_PEERPIDFD from a
socket to trivially authenticate a the sender and various other
use-cases.
For 64bit systems this is pretty trivial to do. For 32bit it's slightly
more annoying as we discussed but we simply add a dumb ida based
allocator that gets used on 32bit. This gives the same guarantees about
inode numbers on 64bit without any overflow risk. Practically, we'll
never run into overflow issues because we're constrained by the number
of processes that can exist on 32bit and by the number of open files
that can exist on a 32bit system. On 64bit none of this matters and
things are very simple.
If 32bit also needs the uniqueness guarantee they can simply parse the
contents of /proc/<pid>/fd/<nr>. The uniqueness guarantees have a
variety of use-cases. One of the most obvious ones is that they will
make pidfiles (or "pidfdfiles", I guess) reliable as the unique
identifier can be placed into there that won't be reycled. Also a
frequent request.
Note, I took the chance and simplified path_from_stashed() even further.
Instead of passing the inode number explicitly to path_from_stashed() we
let the filesystem handle that internally. So path_from_stashed() ends
up even simpler than it is now. This is also a good solution allowing
the cleanup code to be clean and consistent between 32bit and 64bit. The
cleanup path in prepare_anon_dentry() is also switched around so we put
the inode before the dentry allocation. This means we only have to call
the cleanup handler for the filesystem's inode data once and can rely
->evict_inode() otherwise.
Aside from having to have a bit of extra code for 32bit it actually ends
up a nice cleanup for path_from_stashed() imho.
Tested on both 32 and 64bit including error injection.
Link: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/31713 [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240312-dingo-sehnlich-b3ecc35c6de7@brauner
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Moving pidfds from the anonymous inode infrastructure to a separate tiny
in-kernel filesystem similar to sockfs, pipefs, and anon_inodefs causes
selinux denials and thus various userspace components that make heavy
use of pidfds to fail as pidfds used anon_inode_getfile() which aren't
subject to any LSM hooks. But dentry_open() is and that would cause
regressions.
The failures that are seen are selinux denials. But the core failure is
dbus-broker. That cascades into other services failing that depend on
dbus-broker. For example, when dbus-broker fails to start polkit and all
the others won't be able to work because they depend on dbus-broker.
The reason for dbus-broker failing is because it doesn't handle failures
for SO_PEERPIDFD correctly. Last kernel release we introduced
SO_PEERPIDFD (and SCM_PIDFD). SO_PEERPIDFD allows dbus-broker and polkit
and others to receive a pidfd for the peer of an AF_UNIX socket. This is
the first time in the history of Linux that we can safely authenticate
clients in a race-free manner.
dbus-broker immediately made use of this but messed up the error
checking. It only allowed EINVAL as a valid failure for SO_PEERPIDFD.
That's obviously problematic not just because of LSM denials but because
of seccomp denials that would prevent SO_PEERPIDFD from working; or any
other new error code from there.
So this is catching a flawed implementation in dbus-broker as well. It
has to fallback to the old pid-based authentication when SO_PEERPIDFD
doesn't work no matter the reasons otherwise it'll always risk such
failures. So overall that LSM denial should not have caused dbus-broker
to fail. It can never assume that a feature released one kernel ago like
SO_PEERPIDFD can be assumed to be available.
So, the next fix separate from the selinux policy update is to try and
fix dbus-broker at [3]. That should make it into Fedora as well. In
addition the selinux reference policy should also be updated. See [4]
for that. If Selinux is in enforcing mode in userspace and it encounters
anything that it doesn't know about it will deny it by default. And the
policy is entirely in userspace including declaring new types for stuff
like nsfs or pidfs to allow it.
For now we continue to raise S_PRIVATE on the inode if it's a pidfs
inode which means things behave exactly like before.
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2265630
Link: https://github.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/pull/2050
Link: https://github.com/bus1/dbus-broker/pull/343 [3]
Link: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/pull/762 [4]
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240222190334.GA412503@dev-arch.thelio-3990X
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240218-neufahrzeuge-brauhaus-fb0eb6459771@brauner
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
This moves pidfds from the anonymous inode infrastructure to a tiny
pseudo filesystem. This has been on my todo for quite a while as it will
unblock further work that we weren't able to do simply because of the
very justified limitations of anonymous inodes. Moving pidfds to a tiny
pseudo filesystem allows:
* statx() on pidfds becomes useful for the first time.
* pidfds can be compared simply via statx() and then comparing inode
numbers.
* pidfds have unique inode numbers for the system lifetime.
* struct pid is now stashed in inode->i_private instead of
file->private_data. This means it is now possible to introduce
concepts that operate on a process once all file descriptors have been
closed. A concrete example is kill-on-last-close.
* file->private_data is freed up for per-file options for pidfds.
* Each struct pid will refer to a different inode but the same struct
pid will refer to the same inode if it's opened multiple times. In
contrast to now where each struct pid refers to the same inode. Even
if we were to move to anon_inode_create_getfile() which creates new
inodes we'd still be associating the same struct pid with multiple
different inodes.
The tiny pseudo filesystem is not visible anywhere in userspace exactly
like e.g., pipefs and sockfs. There's no lookup, there's no complex
inode operations, nothing. Dentries and inodes are always deleted when
the last pidfd is closed.
We allocate a new inode for each struct pid and we reuse that inode for
all pidfds. We use iget_locked() to find that inode again based on the
inode number which isn't recycled. We allocate a new dentry for each
pidfd that uses the same inode. That is similar to anonymous inodes
which reuse the same inode for thousands of dentries. For pidfds we're
talking way less than that. There usually won't be a lot of concurrent
openers of the same struct pid. They can probably often be counted on
two hands. I know that systemd does use separate pidfd for the same
struct pid for various complex process tracking issues. So I think with
that things actually become way simpler. Especially because we don't
have to care about lookup. Dentries and inodes continue to be always
deleted.
The code is entirely optional and fairly small. If it's not selected we
fallback to anonymous inodes. Heavily inspired by nsfs which uses a
similar stashing mechanism just for namespaces.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213-vfs-pidfd_fs-v1-2-f863f58cfce1@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
We can get EBADF from pidfd_getfd() if a task is currently exiting,
which might be confusing. Let's check PF_EXITING, and just report ESRCH
if so.
I chose PF_EXITING, because it is set in exit_signals(), which is called
before exit_files(). Since ->exit_status is mostly set after
exit_files() in exit_notify(), using that still leaves a window open for
the race.
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tandersen@netflix.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240206192357.81942-1-tycho@tycho.pizza
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Add another wake_up_all(wait_pidfd) into __change_pid() and change
pidfd_poll() to include EPOLLHUP if task == NULL.
This allows to wait until the target process/thread is reaped.
TODO: change do_notify_pidfd() to use the keyed wakeups.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240202131226.GA26018@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
With this flag:
- pidfd_open() doesn't require that the target task must be
a thread-group leader
- pidfd_poll() succeeds when the task exits and becomes a
zombie (iow, passes exit_notify()), even if it is a leader
and thread-group is not empty.
This means that the behaviour of pidfd_poll(PIDFD_THREAD,
pid-of-group-leader) is not well defined if it races with
exec() from its sub-thread; pidfd_poll() can succeed or not
depending on whether pidfd_task_exited() is called before
or after exchange_tids().
Perhaps we can improve this behaviour later, pidfd_poll()
can probably take sig->group_exec_task into account. But
this doesn't really differ from the case when the leader
exits before other threads (so pidfd_poll() succeeds) and
then another thread execs and pidfd_poll() will block again.
thread_group_exited() is no longer used, perhaps it can die.
Co-developed-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240131132602.GA23641@redhat.com
Tested-by: Tycho Andersen <tandersen@netflix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tycho Andersen <tandersen@netflix.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
- make pidfd_create() static.
- Don't pass O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC to __pidfd_prepare() in copy_process(),
__pidfd_prepare() adds these flags unconditionally.
- Kill the flags check in __pidfd_prepare(). sys_pidfd_open() checks the
flags itself, all other users of pidfd_prepare() pass flags = 0.
If we need a sanity check for those other in kernel users then
WARN_ON_ONCE(flags & ~PIDFD_NONBLOCK) makes more sense.
- Don't pass O_RDWR to get_unused_fd_flags(), it ignores everything except
O_CLOEXEC.
- Don't pass O_CLOEXEC to anon_inode_getfile(), it ignores everything except
O_ACCMODE | O_NONBLOCK.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240125161734.GA778@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
This sysctl has the very unusual behaviour of not allowing any user (even
CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to reduce the restriction setting, meaning that if you were
to set this sysctl to a more restrictive option in the host pidns you
would need to reboot your machine in order to reset it.
The justification given in [1] is that this is a security feature and thus
it should not be possible to disable. Aside from the fact that we have
plenty of security-related sysctls that can be disabled after being
enabled (fs.protected_symlinks for instance), the protection provided by
the sysctl is to stop users from being able to create a binary and then
execute it. A user with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can trivially do this without
memfd_create(2):
% cat mount-memfd.c
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#define SHELLCODE "#!/bin/echo this file was executed from this totally private tmpfs:"
int main(void)
{
int fsfd = fsopen("tmpfs", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC);
assert(fsfd >= 0);
assert(!fsconfig(fsfd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 2));
int dfd = fsmount(fsfd, FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC, 0);
assert(dfd >= 0);
int execfd = openat(dfd, "exe", O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0782);
assert(execfd >= 0);
assert(write(execfd, SHELLCODE, strlen(SHELLCODE)) == strlen(SHELLCODE));
assert(!close(execfd));
char *execpath = NULL;
char *argv[] = { "bad-exe", NULL }, *envp[] = { NULL };
execfd = openat(dfd, "exe", O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
assert(execfd >= 0);
assert(asprintf(&execpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", execfd) > 0);
assert(!execve(execpath, argv, envp));
}
% ./mount-memfd
this file was executed from this totally private tmpfs: /proc/self/fd/5
%
Given that it is possible for CAP_SYS_ADMIN users to create executable
binaries without memfd_create(2) and without touching the host filesystem
(not to mention the many other things a CAP_SYS_ADMIN process would be
able to do that would be equivalent or worse), it seems strange to cause a
fair amount of headache to admins when there doesn't appear to be an
actual security benefit to blocking this. There appear to be concerns
about confused-deputy-esque attacks[2] but a confused deputy that can
write to arbitrary sysctls is a bigger security issue than executable
memfds.
/* New API */
The primary requirement from the original author appears to be more based
on the need to be able to restrict an entire system in a hierarchical
manner[3], such that child namespaces cannot re-enable executable memfds.
So, implement that behaviour explicitly -- the vm.memfd_noexec scope is
evaluated up the pidns tree to &init_pid_ns and you have the most
restrictive value applied to you. The new lower limit you can set
vm.memfd_noexec is whatever limit applies to your parent.
Note that a pidns will inherit a copy of the parent pidns's effective
vm.memfd_noexec setting at unshare() time. This matches the existing
behaviour, and it also ensures that a pidns will never have its
vm.memfd_noexec setting *lowered* behind its back (but it will be raised
if the parent raises theirs).
/* Backwards Compatibility */
As the previous version of the sysctl didn't allow you to lower the
setting at all, there are no backwards compatibility issues with this
aspect of the change.
However it should be noted that now that the setting is completely
hierarchical. Previously, a cloned pidns would just copy the current
pidns setting, meaning that if the parent's vm.memfd_noexec was changed it
wouldn't propoagate to existing pid namespaces. Now, the restriction
applies recursively. This is a uAPI change, however:
* The sysctl is very new, having been merged in 6.3.
* Several aspects of the sysctl were broken up until this patchset and
the other patchset by Jeff Xu last month.
And thus it seems incredibly unlikely that any real users would run into
this issue. In the worst case, if this causes userspace isues we could
make it so that modifying the setting follows the hierarchical rules but
the restriction checking uses the cached copy.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/CABi2SkWnAgHK1i6iqSqPMYuNEhtHBkO8jUuCvmG3RmUB5TKHJw@mail.gmail.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/CALmYWFs_dNCzw_pW1yRAo4bGCPEtykroEQaowNULp7svwMLjOg@mail.gmail.com/
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/CALmYWFuahdUF7cT4cm7_TGLqPanuHXJ-hVSfZt7vpTnc18DPrw@mail.gmail.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814-memfd-vm-noexec-uapi-fixes-v2-4-7ff9e3e10ba6@cyphar.com
Fixes: 105ff5339f ("mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Before commit d67790ddf0 ("overflow: Add struct_size_t() helper") only
struct_size() existed, which expects a valid pointer instance containing
the flexible array.
However, when we determine the default struct pid allocation size for
the associated kmem cache of a pid namespace we need to take the nesting
depth of the pid namespace into account without an variable instance
necessarily being available.
In commit b69f0aeb06 ("pid: Replace struct pid 1-element array with
flex-array") we used to handle this the old fashioned way and cast NULL
to a struct pid pointer type. However, we do apparently have a dedicated
struct_size_t() helper for exactly this case. So switch to that.
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add a new helper that allows to reserve a pidfd and allocates a new
pidfd file that stashes the provided struct pid. This will allow us to
remove places that either open code this function or that call
pidfd_create() but then have to call close_fd() because there are still
failure points after pidfd_create() has been called.
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-Id: <20230327-pidfd-file-api-v1-1-5c0e9a3158e4@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
When a process has a gfs2 file open, the file is keeping a reference on the
underlying gfs2 inode, and the inode is keeping the inode's iopen glock held in
shared mode. In other words, the process depends on the iopen glock of each
open gfs2 file. Expose those dependencies in a new "glockfd" debugfs file.
The new debugfs file contains one line for each gfs2 file descriptor,
specifying the tgid, file descriptor number, and glock name, e.g.,
1601 6 5/816d
This list is compiled by iterating all tasks on the system using find_ge_pid(),
and all file descriptors of each task using task_lookup_next_fd_rcu(). To make
that work from gfs2, export those two functions.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
By adding the pidfd_create() declaration to linux/pid.h, we
effectively expose this function to the rest of the kernel. In order
to avoid any unintended behavior, or set false expectations upon this
function, ensure that constraints are forced upon each of the passed
parameters. This includes the checking of whether the passed struct
pid is a thread-group leader as pidfd creation is currently limited to
such pid types.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2e9b91c2d529d52a003b8b86c45f866153be9eb5.1628398044.git.repnop@google.com
Signed-off-by: Matthew Bobrowski <repnop@google.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Pull exec-update-lock update from Eric Biederman:
"The key point of this is to transform exec_update_mutex into a
rw_semaphore so readers can be separated from writers.
This makes it easier to understand what the holders of the lock are
doing, and makes it harder to contend or deadlock on the lock.
The real deadlock fix wound up in perf_event_open"
* 'exec-update-lock-for-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
exec: Transform exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore
Pull misc fixes from Christian Brauner:
"This contains several fixes which felt worth being combined into a
single branch:
- Use put_nsproxy() instead of open-coding it switch_task_namespaces()
- Kirill's work to unify lifecycle management for all namespaces. The
lifetime counters are used identically for all namespaces types.
Namespaces may of course have additional unrelated counters and
these are not altered. This work allows us to unify the type of the
counters and reduces maintenance cost by moving the counter in one
place and indicating that basic lifetime management is identical
for all namespaces.
- Peilin's fix adding three byte padding to Dmitry's
PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO uapi struct to prevent an info leak.
- Two smal patches to convert from the /* fall through */ comment
annotation to the fallthrough keyword annotation which I had taken
into my branch and into -next before df561f6688 ("treewide: Use
fallthrough pseudo-keyword") made it upstream which fixed this
tree-wide.
Since I didn't want to invalidate all testing for other commits I
didn't rebase and kept them"
* tag 'fixes-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
nsproxy: use put_nsproxy() in switch_task_namespaces()
sys: Convert to the new fallthrough notation
signal: Convert to the new fallthrough notation
time: Use generic ns_common::count
cgroup: Use generic ns_common::count
mnt: Use generic ns_common::count
user: Use generic ns_common::count
pid: Use generic ns_common::count
ipc: Use generic ns_common::count
uts: Use generic ns_common::count
net: Use generic ns_common::count
ns: Add a common refcount into ns_common
ptrace: Prevent kernel-infoleak in ptrace_get_syscall_info()
Introduce PIDFD_NONBLOCK to support non-blocking pidfd file descriptors.
Ever since the introduction of pidfds and more advanced async io various
programming languages such as Rust have grown support for async event
libraries. These libraries are created to help build epoll-based event loops
around file descriptors. A common pattern is to automatically make all file
descriptors they manage to O_NONBLOCK.
For such libraries the EAGAIN error code is treated specially. When a function
is called that returns EAGAIN the function isn't called again until the event
loop indicates the the file descriptor is ready. Supporting EAGAIN when
waiting on pidfds makes such libraries just work with little effort. In the
following patch we will extend waitid() internally to support non-blocking
pidfds.
This introduces a new flag PIDFD_NONBLOCK that is equivalent to O_NONBLOCK.
This follows the same patterns we have for other (anon inode) file descriptors
such as EFD_NONBLOCK, IN_NONBLOCK, SFD_NONBLOCK, TFD_NONBLOCK and the same for
close-on-exec flags.
Suggested-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200811181236.GA18763@localhost/
Link: https://github.com/joshtriplett/async-pidfd
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200902102130.147672-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Switch over pid namespaces to use the newly introduced common lifetime
counter.
Currently every namespace type has its own lifetime counter which is stored
in the specific namespace struct. The lifetime counters are used
identically for all namespaces types. Namespaces may of course have
additional unrelated counters and these are not altered.
This introduces a common lifetime counter into struct ns_common. The
ns_common struct encompasses information that all namespaces share. That
should include the lifetime counter since its common for all of them.
It also allows us to unify the type of the counters across all namespaces.
Most of them use refcount_t but one uses atomic_t and at least one uses
kref. Especially the last one doesn't make much sense since it's just a
wrapper around refcount_t since 2016 and actually complicates cleanup
operations by having to use container_of() to cast the correct namespace
struct out of struct ns_common.
Having the lifetime counter for the namespaces in one place reduces
maintenance cost. Not just because after switching all namespaces over we
will have removed more code than we added but also because the logic is
more easily understandable and we indicate to the user that the basic
lifetime requirements for all namespaces are currently identical.
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/159644979226.604812.7512601754841882036.stgit@localhost.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Pull checkpoint-restore updates from Christian Brauner:
"This enables unprivileged checkpoint/restore of processes.
Given that this work has been going on for quite some time the first
sentence in this summary is hopefully more exciting than the actual
final code changes required. Unprivileged checkpoint/restore has seen
a frequent increase in interest over the last two years and has thus
been one of the main topics for the combined containers &
checkpoint/restore microconference since at least 2018 (cf. [1]).
Here are just the three most frequent use-cases that were brought forward:
- The JVM developers are integrating checkpoint/restore into a Java
VM to significantly decrease the startup time.
- In high-performance computing environment a resource manager will
typically be distributing jobs where users are always running as
non-root. Long-running and "large" processes with significant
startup times are supposed to be checkpointed and restored with
CRIU.
- Container migration as a non-root user.
In all of these scenarios it is either desirable or required to run
without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. The userspace implementation of
checkpoint/restore CRIU already has the pull request for supporting
unprivileged checkpoint/restore up (cf. [2]).
To enable unprivileged checkpoint/restore a new dedicated capability
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is introduced. This solution has last been
discussed in 2019 in a talk by Google at Linux Plumbers (cf. [1]
"Update on Task Migration at Google Using CRIU") with Adrian and
Nicolas providing the implementation now over the last months. In
essence, this allows the CRIU binary to be installed with the
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE vfs capability set thereby enabling
unprivileged users to restore processes.
To make this possible the following permissions are altered:
- Selecting a specific PID via clone3() set_tid relaxed from userns
CAP_SYS_ADMIN to CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
- Selecting a specific PID via /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid relaxed
from userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN to CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
- Accessing /proc/pid/map_files relaxed from init userns
CAP_SYS_ADMIN to init userns CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
- Changing /proc/self/exe from userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN to userns
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
Of these four changes the /proc/self/exe change deserves a few words
because the reasoning behind even restricting /proc/self/exe changes
in the first place is just full of historical quirks and tracking this
down was a questionable version of fun that I'd like to spare others.
In short, it is trivial to change /proc/self/exe as an unprivileged
user, i.e. without userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN right now. Either via ptrace()
or by simply intercepting the elf loader in userspace during exec.
Nicolas was nice enough to even provide a POC for the latter (cf. [3])
to illustrate this fact.
The original patchset which introduced PR_SET_MM_MAP had no
permissions around changing the exe link. They too argued that it is
trivial to spoof the exe link already which is true. The argument
brought up against this was that the Tomoyo LSM uses the exe link in
tomoyo_manager() to detect whether the calling process is a policy
manager. This caused changing the exe links to be guarded by userns
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
All in all this rather seems like a "better guard it with something
rather than nothing" argument which imho doesn't qualify as a great
security policy. Again, because spoofing the exe link is possible for
the calling process so even if this were security relevant it was
broken back then and would be broken today. So technically, dropping
all permissions around changing the exe link would probably be
possible and would send a clearer message to any userspace that relies
on /proc/self/exe for security reasons that they should stop doing
this but for now we're only relaxing the exe link permissions from
userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN to userns CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
There's a final uapi change in here. Changing the exe link used to
accidently return EINVAL when the caller lacked the necessary
permissions instead of the more correct EPERM. This pr contains a
commit fixing this. I assume that userspace won't notice or care and
if they do I will revert this commit. But since we are changing the
permissions anyway it seems like a good opportunity to try this fix.
With these changes merged unprivileged checkpoint/restore will be
possible and has already been tested by various users"
[1] LPC 2018
1. "Task Migration at Google Using CRIU"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yI_1cuhoDgA&t=12095
2. "Securely Migrating Untrusted Workloads with CRIU"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yI_1cuhoDgA&t=14400
LPC 2019
1. "CRIU and the PID dance"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LN2CUgp8deo&list=PLVsQ_xZBEyN30ZA3Pc9MZMFzdjwyz26dO&index=9&t=2m48s
2. "Update on Task Migration at Google Using CRIU"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LN2CUgp8deo&list=PLVsQ_xZBEyN30ZA3Pc9MZMFzdjwyz26dO&index=9&t=1h2m8s
[2] https://github.com/checkpoint-restore/criu/pull/1155
[3] https://github.com/nviennot/run_as_exe
* tag 'cap-checkpoint-restore-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
selftests: add clone3() CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE test
prctl: exe link permission error changed from -EINVAL to -EPERM
prctl: Allow local CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to change /proc/self/exe
proc: allow access in init userns for map_files with CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
pid_namespace: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for ns_last_pid
pid: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for set_tid
capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
Starting from 2c4704756c ("pids: Move the pgrp and session pid pointers
from task_struct to signal_struct") __task_pid_nr_ns() doesn't dereference
task->group_leader, we can remove the pid_alive() check.
pid_nr_ns() has to check pid != NULL anyway, pid_alive() just adds the
unnecessary confusion.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
When the thread group leader changes during exec and the old leaders
thread is reaped proc_flush_pid will flush the dentries for the entire
process because the leader still has it's original pid.
Fix this by exchanging the pids in an rcu safe manner,
and wrapping the code to do that up in a helper exchange_tids.
When I removed switch_exec_pids and introduced this behavior
in d73d65293e ("[PATCH] pidhash: kill switch_exec_pids") there
really was nothing that cared as flushing happened with
the cached dentry and de_thread flushed both of them on exec.
This lack of fully exchanging pids became a problem a few months later
when I introduced 48e6484d49 ("[PATCH] proc: Rewrite the proc dentry
flush on exit optimization"). Which overlooked the de_thread case
was no longer swapping pids, and I was looking up proc dentries
by task->pid.
The current behavior isn't properly a bug as everything in proc will
continue to work correctly just a little bit less efficiently. Fix
this just so there are no little surprise corner cases waiting to bite
people.
-- Oleg points out this could be an issue in next_tgid in proc where
has_group_leader_pid is called, and reording some of the assignments
should fix that.
-- Oleg points out this will break the 10 year old hack in __exit_signal.c
> /*
> * This can only happen if the caller is de_thread().
> * FIXME: this is the temporary hack, we should teach
> * posix-cpu-timers to handle this case correctly.
> */
> if (unlikely(has_group_leader_pid(tsk)))
> posix_cpu_timers_exit_group(tsk);
The code in next_tgid has been changed to use PIDTYPE_TGID,
and the posix cpu timers code has been fixed so it does not
need the 10 year old hack, so this should be safe to merge
now.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87h7x3ajll.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org/
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Fixes: 48e6484d49 ("[PATCH] proc: Rewrite the proc dentry flush on exit optimization").
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Pull proc fix from Eric Biederman:
"A brown paper bag slipped through my proc changes, and syzcaller
caught it when the code ended up in your tree.
I have opted to fix it the simplest cleanest way I know how, so there
is no reasonable chance for the bug to repeat"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
proc: Use a dedicated lock in struct pid
syzbot wrote:
> ========================================================
> WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
> 5.6.0-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
> --------------------------------------------------------
> swapper/1/0 just changed the state of lock:
> ffffffff898090d8 (tasklist_lock){.+.?}-{2:2}, at: send_sigurg+0x9f/0x320 fs/fcntl.c:840
> but this lock took another, SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock in the past:
> (&pid->wait_pidfd){+.+.}-{2:2}
>
>
> and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.
>
>
> other info that might help us debug this:
> Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
>
> CPU0 CPU1
> ---- ----
> lock(&pid->wait_pidfd);
> local_irq_disable();
> lock(tasklist_lock);
> lock(&pid->wait_pidfd);
> <Interrupt>
> lock(tasklist_lock);
>
> *** DEADLOCK ***
>
> 4 locks held by swapper/1/0:
The problem is that because wait_pidfd.lock is taken under the tasklist
lock. It must always be taken with irqs disabled as tasklist_lock can be
taken from interrupt context and if wait_pidfd.lock was already taken this
would create a lock order inversion.
Oleg suggested just disabling irqs where I have added extra calls to
wait_pidfd.lock. That should be safe and I think the code will eventually
do that. It was rightly pointed out by Christian that sharing the
wait_pidfd.lock was a premature optimization.
It is also true that my pre-merge window testing was insufficient. So
remove the premature optimization and give struct pid a dedicated lock of
it's own for struct pid things. I have verified that lockdep sees all 3
paths where we take the new pid->lock and lockdep does not complain.
It is my current day dream that one day pid->lock can be used to guard the
task lists as well and then the tasklist_lock won't need to be held to
deliver signals. That will require taking pid->lock with irqs disabled.
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/00000000000011d66805a25cd73f@google.com/
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+343f75cdeea091340956@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+832aabf700bc3ec920b9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+f675f964019f884dbd0f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+a9fb1457d720a55d6dc5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 7bc3e6e55a ("proc: Use a list of inodes to flush from proc")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Pull exec/proc updates from Eric Biederman:
"This contains two significant pieces of work: the work to sort out
proc_flush_task, and the work to solve a deadlock between strace and
exec.
Fixing proc_flush_task so that it no longer requires a persistent
mount makes improvements to proc possible. The removal of the
persistent mount solves an old regression that that caused the hidepid
mount option to only work on remount not on mount. The regression was
found and reported by the Android folks. This further allows Alexey
Gladkov's work making proc mount options specific to an individual
mount of proc to move forward.
The work on exec starts solving a long standing issue with exec that
it takes mutexes of blocking userspace applications, which makes exec
extremely deadlock prone. For the moment this adds a second mutex with
a narrower scope that handles all of the easy cases. Which makes the
tricky cases easy to spot. With a little luck the code to solve those
deadlocks will be ready by next merge window"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (25 commits)
signal: Extend exec_id to 64bits
pidfd: Use new infrastructure to fix deadlocks in execve
perf: Use new infrastructure to fix deadlocks in execve
proc: io_accounting: Use new infrastructure to fix deadlocks in execve
proc: Use new infrastructure to fix deadlocks in execve
kernel/kcmp.c: Use new infrastructure to fix deadlocks in execve
kernel: doc: remove outdated comment cred.c
mm: docs: Fix a comment in process_vm_rw_core
selftests/ptrace: add test cases for dead-locks
exec: Fix a deadlock in strace
exec: Add exec_update_mutex to replace cred_guard_mutex
exec: Move exec_mmap right after de_thread in flush_old_exec
exec: Move cleanup of posix timers on exec out of de_thread
exec: Factor unshare_sighand out of de_thread and call it separately
exec: Only compute current once in flush_old_exec
pid: Improve the comment about waiting in zap_pid_ns_processes
proc: Remove the now unnecessary internal mount of proc
uml: Create a private mount of proc for mconsole
uml: Don't consult current to find the proc_mnt in mconsole_proc
proc: Use a list of inodes to flush from proc
...
This changes __pidfd_fget to use the new exec_update_mutex
instead of cred_guard_mutex.
This should be safe, as the credentials do not change
before exec_update_mutex is locked. Therefore whatever
file access is possible with holding the cred_guard_mutex
here is also possbile with the exec_update_mutex.
Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The alloc_pid() codepath used to be simpler. With the introducation of the
ability to choose specific pids in 49cb2fc42c ("fork: extend clone3() to
support setting a PID") it got more complex. It hasn't been super obvious
that ENOMEM is returned when the pid namespace init process/child subreaper
of the pid namespace has died. As can be seen from multiple attempts to
improve this see e.g. [1] and most recently [2].
We regressed returning ENOMEM in [3] and [2] restored it. Let's add a
comment on top explaining that this is historic and documented behavior and
cannot easily be changed.
[1]: 35f71bc0a0 ("fork: report pid reservation failure properly")
[2]: b26ebfe12f ("pid: Fix error return value in some cases")
[3]: 49cb2fc42c ("fork: extend clone3() to support setting a PID")
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Recent changes to alloc_pid() allow the pid number to be specified on
the command line. If set_tid_size is set, then the code scanning the
levels will hard-set retval to -EPERM, overriding it's previous -ENOMEM
value.
After the code scanning the levels, there are error returns that do not
set retval, assuming it is still set to -ENOMEM.
So set retval back to -ENOMEM after scanning the levels.
Fixes: 49cb2fc42c ("fork: extend clone3() to support setting a PID")
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200306172314.12232-1-minyard@acm.org
[christian.brauner@ubuntu.com: fixup commit message]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
There remains no more code in the kernel using pids_ns->proc_mnt,
therefore remove it from the kernel.
The big benefit of this change is that one of the most error prone and
tricky parts of the pid namespace implementation, maintaining kernel
mounts of proc is removed.
In addition removing the unnecessary complexity of the kernel mount
fixes a regression that caused the proc mount options to be ignored.
Now that the initial mount of proc comes from userspace, those mount
options are again honored. This fixes Android's usage of the proc
hidepid option.
Reported-by: Alistair Strachan <astrachan@google.com>
Fixes: e94591d0d9 ("proc: Convert proc_mount to use mount_ns.")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Rework the flushing of proc to use a list of directory inodes that
need to be flushed.
The list is kept on struct pid not on struct task_struct, as there is
a fixed connection between proc inodes and pids but at least for the
case of de_thread the pid of a task_struct changes.
This removes the dependency on proc_mnt which allows for different
mounts of proc having different mount options even in the same pid
namespace and this allows for the removal of proc_mnt which will
trivially the first mount of proc to honor it's mount options.
This flushing remains an optimization. The functions
pid_delete_dentry and pid_revalidate ensure that ordinary dcache
management will not attempt to use dentries past the point their
respective task has died. When unused the shrinker will
eventually be able to remove these dentries.
There is a case in de_thread where proc_flush_pid can be
called early for a given pid. Which winds up being
safe (if suboptimal) as this is just an optiimization.
Only pid directories are put on the list as the other
per pid files are children of those directories and
d_invalidate on the directory will get them as well.
So that the pid can be used during flushing it's reference count is
taken in release_task and dropped in proc_flush_pid. Further the call
of proc_flush_pid is moved after the tasklist_lock is released in
release_task so that it is certain that the pid has already been
unhashed when flushing it taking place. This removes a small race
where a dentry could recreated.
As struct pid is supposed to be small and I need a per pid lock
I reuse the only lock that currently exists in struct pid the
the wait_pidfd.lock.
The net result is that this adds all of this functionality
with just a little extra list management overhead and
a single extra pointer in struct pid.
v2: Initialize pid->inodes. I somehow failed to get that
initialization into the initial version of the patch. A boot
failure was reported by "kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>", and
failure to initialize that pid->inodes matches all of the reported
symptoms.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This syscall allows for the retrieval of file descriptors from other
processes, based on their pidfd. This is possible using ptrace, and
injection of parasitic code to inject code which leverages SCM_RIGHTS
to move file descriptors between a tracee and a tracer. Unfortunately,
ptrace comes with a high cost of requiring the process to be stopped,
and breaks debuggers. This does not require stopping the process under
manipulation.
One reason to use this is to allow sandboxers to take actions on file
descriptors on the behalf of another process. For example, this can be
combined with seccomp-bpf's user notification to do on-demand fd
extraction and take privileged actions. One such privileged action
is binding a socket to a privileged port.
/* prototype */
/* flags is currently reserved and should be set to 0 */
int sys_pidfd_getfd(int pidfd, int fd, unsigned int flags);
/* testing */
Ran self-test suite on x86_64
Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200107175927.4558-3-sargun@sargun.me
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The main motivation to add set_tid to clone3() is CRIU.
To restore a process with the same PID/TID CRIU currently uses
/proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid. It writes the desired (PID - 1) to
ns_last_pid and then (quickly) does a clone(). This works most of the
time, but it is racy. It is also slow as it requires multiple syscalls.
Extending clone3() to support *set_tid makes it possible restore a
process using CRIU without accessing /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid and
race free (as long as the desired PID/TID is available).
This clone3() extension places the same restrictions (CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
on clone3() with *set_tid as they are currently in place for ns_last_pid.
The original version of this change was using a single value for
set_tid. At the 2019 LPC, after presenting set_tid, it was, however,
decided to change set_tid to an array to enable setting the PID of a
process in multiple PID namespaces at the same time. If a process is
created in a PID namespace it is possible to influence the PID inside
and outside of the PID namespace. Details also in the corresponding
selftest.
To create a process with the following PIDs:
PID NS level Requested PID
0 (host) 31496
1 42
2 1
For that example the two newly introduced parameters to struct
clone_args (set_tid and set_tid_size) would need to be:
set_tid[0] = 1;
set_tid[1] = 42;
set_tid[2] = 31496;
set_tid_size = 3;
If only the PIDs of the two innermost nested PID namespaces should be
defined it would look like this:
set_tid[0] = 1;
set_tid[1] = 42;
set_tid_size = 2;
The PID of the newly created process would then be the next available
free PID in the PID namespace level 0 (host) and 42 in the PID namespace
at level 1 and the PID of the process in the innermost PID namespace
would be 1.
The set_tid array is used to specify the PID of a process starting
from the innermost nested PID namespaces up to set_tid_size PID namespaces.
set_tid_size cannot be larger then the current PID namespace level.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191115123621.142252-1-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Pull pidfd updates from Christian Brauner:
"This adds two main features.
- First, it adds polling support for pidfds. This allows process
managers to know when a (non-parent) process dies in a race-free
way.
The notification mechanism used follows the same logic that is
currently used when the parent of a task is notified of a child's
death. With this patchset it is possible to put pidfds in an
{e}poll loop and get reliable notifications for process (i.e.
thread-group) exit.
- The second feature compliments the first one by making it possible
to retrieve pollable pidfds for processes that were not created
using CLONE_PIDFD.
A lot of processes get created with traditional PID-based calls
such as fork() or clone() (without CLONE_PIDFD). For these
processes a caller can currently not create a pollable pidfd. This
is a problem for Android's low memory killer (LMK) and service
managers such as systemd.
Both patchsets are accompanied by selftests.
It's perhaps worth noting that the work done so far and the work done
in this branch for pidfd_open() and polling support do already see
some adoption:
- Android is in the process of backporting this work to all their LTS
kernels [1]
- Service managers make use of pidfd_send_signal but will need to
wait until we enable waiting on pidfds for full adoption.
- And projects I maintain make use of both pidfd_send_signal and
CLONE_PIDFD [2] and will use polling support and pidfd_open() too"
[1] https://android-review.googlesource.com/q/topic:%22pidfd+polling+support+4.9+backport%22https://android-review.googlesource.com/q/topic:%22pidfd+polling+support+4.14+backport%22https://android-review.googlesource.com/q/topic:%22pidfd+polling+support+4.19+backport%22
[2] https://github.com/lxc/lxc/blob/aab6e3eb73c343231cdde775db938994fc6f2803/src/lxc/start.c#L1753
* tag 'pidfd-updates-v5.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
tests: add pidfd_open() tests
arch: wire-up pidfd_open()
pid: add pidfd_open()
pidfd: add polling selftests
pidfd: add polling support
This adds the pidfd_open() syscall. It allows a caller to retrieve pollable
pidfds for a process which did not get created via CLONE_PIDFD, i.e. for a
process that is created via traditional fork()/clone() calls that is only
referenced by a PID:
int pidfd = pidfd_open(1234, 0);
ret = pidfd_send_signal(pidfd, SIGSTOP, NULL, 0);
With the introduction of pidfds through CLONE_PIDFD it is possible to
created pidfds at process creation time.
However, a lot of processes get created with traditional PID-based calls
such as fork() or clone() (without CLONE_PIDFD). For these processes a
caller can currently not create a pollable pidfd. This is a problem for
Android's low memory killer (LMK) and service managers such as systemd.
Both are examples of tools that want to make use of pidfds to get reliable
notification of process exit for non-parents (pidfd polling) and race-free
signal sending (pidfd_send_signal()). They intend to switch to this API for
process supervision/management as soon as possible. Having no way to get
pollable pidfds from PID-only processes is one of the biggest blockers for
them in adopting this api. With pidfd_open() making it possible to retrieve
pidfds for PID-based processes we enable them to adopt this api.
In line with Arnd's recent changes to consolidate syscall numbers across
architectures, I have added the pidfd_open() syscall to all architectures
at the same time.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
This patch adds polling support to pidfd.
Android low memory killer (LMK) needs to know when a process dies once
it is sent the kill signal. It does so by checking for the existence of
/proc/pid which is both racy and slow. For example, if a PID is reused
between when LMK sends a kill signal and checks for existence of the
PID, since the wrong PID is now possibly checked for existence.
Using the polling support, LMK will be able to get notified when a process
exists in race-free and fast way, and allows the LMK to do other things
(such as by polling on other fds) while awaiting the process being killed
to die.
For notification to polling processes, we follow the same existing
mechanism in the kernel used when the parent of the task group is to be
notified of a child's death (do_notify_parent). This is precisely when the
tasks waiting on a poll of pidfd are also awakened in this patch.
We have decided to include the waitqueue in struct pid for the following
reasons:
1. The wait queue has to survive for the lifetime of the poll. Including
it in task_struct would not be option in this case because the task can
be reaped and destroyed before the poll returns.
2. By including the struct pid for the waitqueue means that during
de_thread(), the new thread group leader automatically gets the new
waitqueue/pid even though its task_struct is different.
Appropriate test cases are added in the second patch to provide coverage of
all the cases the patch is handling.
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Kowalski <bl0pbl33p@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: kernel-team@android.com
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:
- Have no license information of any form
- Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_GPL inside which was used in the
initial scan/conversion to ignore the file
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
gaoxiang17
Al Viro
Christian Brauner
Tycho Andersen
Oleg Nesterov
Randy Dunlap
Aleksa Sarai
Kees Cook
Andreas Gruenbacher
Christian Brauner
Matthew Bobrowski
Linus Torvalds
Eric W. Biederman
Minchan Kim
Kirill Tkhai
Adrian Reber
Bernd Edlinger
Corey Minyard
Sargun Dhillon
Joel Fernandes (Google)
Christian Brauner
Thomas Gleixner
Timmy Li