rxrpc_input_ackall() accepts ACKALL packets without checking whether the
call is in a state that can legitimately have outstanding transmit buffers.
A forged ACKALL can therefore reach a new service call in
RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST before any reply packets have been queued.
In that state call->tx_top is zero and call->tx_queue is NULL, so
rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() dereferences a NULL txqueue and triggers a
null-pointer dereference.
Fix the handling of ACKALL packets by the following means:
(1) Add two new call states: RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND which indicates
that the client call is connected, but nothing has been transmitted as
yet; and RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_ACK, which indicates that everything
has been transmitted at least once, but we're now waiting for the
stuff remaining in the Tx buffer to be ACK'd (retransmissions may
still happen).
The RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND state is set when the call is assigned
a channel and transitions to RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_SEND_REQUEST when the
first packet is transmitted.
RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY is then narrowed in scope to indicate
that all Tx packets have been ACK'd and we're now waiting for the
reply to be received.
(2) As per Wyatt Feng's original patch[1], the ACKALL handler then checks
that the call state is one in which there might be stuff in the Tx
buffer to ACK, but now this includes AWAIT_ACK rather than
AWAIT_REPLY. ACKALL packets are ignored if received in the wrong
state.
Note that unlike Wyatt Feng's patch, it's no longer necessary to check
to see if the Tx buffer exists as this the state set now covers this.
(3) Make the ACKALL handler use call->tx_transmitted rather than
call->tx_top as the former is explicitly the highest packet seq number
transmitted, whereas the latter has a looser definition.
Thanks to Jeffrey Altman for a description of the history of the ACKALL
packet[1].
Fixes: b341a0263b ("rxrpc: Implement progressive transmission queue struct")
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Wyatt Feng <bronzed_45_vested@icloud.com>
Co-developed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260616155749.2125907-2-dhowells@redhat.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c0fd4fec-1576-4070-b31e-a37d5506f5ed@auristor.com/ [2]
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260624163819.3017002-2-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Merge in late fixes in preparation for the net-next PR.
Conflicts:
net/tls/tls_sw.c
406e8a651a ("net: skmsg: preserve sg.copy across SG transforms")
79511603a6 ("tls: remove dead sockmap (psock) handling from the SW path")
drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/mana_en.c
f8fd56977e ("net: mana: guard TX wq object destroy with INVALID_MANA_HANDLE check")
d07efe5a6e ("net: mana: Use per-queue allocation for tx_qp to reduce allocation size")
https://lore.kernel.org/ajAPXu-C_PuTgV-a@sirena.org.uk
No adjacent changes.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
rxrpc_recvmsg_oob() takes a received oob message off recvmsg_oobq and,
if a response is needed, moves it onto the pending_oobq tree. However,
only the unlink from recvmsg_oobq is guarded by MSG_PEEK; the move onto
pending_oobq always runs.
As a result, reading a challenge with MSG_PEEK leaves the skb on
recvmsg_oobq while also adding it to pending_oobq. Since struct
sk_buff's rbnode shares storage with its next and prev pointers,
rb_insert_color() overwrites the list linkage, and the skb, which holds
a single reference, becomes reachable from both queues at once.
When the socket is closed both queues are drained in turn. While
draining recvmsg_oobq, __skb_unlink() follows the next and prev
pointers that rbnode has overwritten and writes to a bad address. Also,
as the skb holds a single reference but is freed from each queue, both
the skb and the connection reference it holds are released twice. This
leads to memory corruption and to a use-after-free caused by the
connection refcount underflow.
MSG_PEEK does not consume the message from the queue, so only unlink it
from recvmsg_oobq and then move it onto pending_oobq or free it when
the message is actually consumed.
Fixes: 5800b1cf3f ("rxrpc: Allow CHALLENGEs to the passed to the app for a RESPONSE")
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260609140911.838677-3-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
rxrpc_recvmsg_data() calls rxrpc_verify_data() whenever the
rxrpc_call.rx_dec_buffer is unallocated and assumes that upon
successful return that rx_dec_buffer must be allocated.
However, rxrpc_verify_data() does not request an allocation if
the rxrpc_skb_priv.len is zero.
In addition, failure to allocate rx_dec_buffer will result in a
call to skb_copy_bits() with a NULL destination which can
trigger a NULL pointer dereference.
To prevent these issues rxrpc_verify_data() is modified to
always attempt to allocate the rxrpc_call.rx_dec_buffer if it
is NULL.
This issue was identified with assistance of a private
sashiko instance.
Fixes: d2bc90cf6c ("rxrpc: Fix DATA decrypt vs splice() by copying data to buffer in recvmsg")
Reported-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260609140911.838677-2-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR (net-7.1-rc8).
Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/wangxun/txgbe/txgbe_aml.c
f67aead16e ("net: txgbe: rework service event handling")
57d39faed4 ("net: txgbe: improve functions of AML 40G devices")
net/rds/info.c
512db8267b ("rds: mark snapshot pages dirty in rds_info_getsockopt()")
6e94eeb2a2 ("rds: convert to getsockopt_iter")
Adjacent changes:
include/net/sock.h
1ee90b77b7 ("net: guard timestamp cmsgs to real error queue skbs")
f0de88303d ("net: make is_skb_wmem() available to modules")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Since the use of "pcbc(des)" in rxkad_decrypt_ticket() is the only
remaining user of the crypto API "pcbc" template, just implement
DES-PCBC by locally implementing PCBC mode on top of the DES library.
Note that only the decryption direction is needed.
This will allow support for the obsolete PCBC mode to be removed from
the crypto API.
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522050740.84561-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Use the local implementation of FCrypt-PCBC instead of the crypto API
one. This will allow the crypto API one to be removed. It also
simplifies the code quite a bit.
The local FCrypt-PCBC implementation is also significantly faster than
the crypto API one, since the crypto API one had a lot of overhead. For
example, benchmarking on an x86_64 CPU, I see that FCrypt-PCBC
decryption throughput improved from 83 MB/s to 157 MB/s.
(Meanwhile, AES-256-GCM decryption is 8064 MB/s on the same CPU.
Clearly, anyone looking for good performance, or anything that is
actually secure for that matter, needs to look elsewhere anyway.)
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522050740.84561-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Add a local implementation of FCrypt-PCBC encryption and decryption.
This will be used instead of the crypto API one, allowing the crypto API
one to be removed. It will also simplify rxkad.c quite a bit.
A KUnit test is included. The FCrypt-PCBC test vectors are borrowed
from the existing ones in crypto/testmgr.h. Note that this adds the
first KUnit test for net/rxrpc/, which previously had no KUnit tests.
The FCrypt code is based on crypto/fcrypt.c, but I simplified it a bit.
The PCBC part is straightforward and I just wrote it from scratch.
Tested with:
kunit.py run --kunitconfig net/rxrpc/
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522050740.84561-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Convert RxRPC socket's getsockopt implementation to use the new
getsockopt_iter callback with sockopt_t.
Key changes:
- Replace (char __user *optval, int __user *optlen) with sockopt_t *opt
- Use opt->optlen for buffer length (input) and returned size (output)
- Use copy_to_iter() instead of put_user()/copy_to_user()
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260520-getsock_four-v3-5-b8c0b16b7780@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
This improves the fix for CVE-2026-43500.
Fix the pagecache corruption from in-place decryption of a DATA packet
transmitted locally by splice() by getting rid of the packet sharing in the
I/O thread and unconditionally extracting the packet content into a bounce
buffer in which the buffer is decrypted. recvmsg() (or the kernel
equivalent) then copies the data from the bounce buffer to the destination
buffer. The sk_buff then remains unmodified.
This has an additional advantage in that the packet is then arranged in the
buffer with the correct alignment required for the crypto algorithms to
process directly. The performance of the crypto does seem to be a little
faster and, surprisingly, the unencrypted performance doesn't seem to
change much - possibly due to removing complexity from the I/O thread.
Yet another advantage is that the I/O thread doesn't have to copy packets
which would slow down packet distribution, ACK generation, etc..
The buffer belongs to the call and is allocated initially at 2K,
sufficiently large to hold a whole jumbo subpacket, but the buffer will be
increased in size if needed. However, to take this work, MSG_PEEK may
cause a later packet to be decrypted into the buffer, in which case the
earlier one will need re-decrypting for a subsequent recvmsg().
Note that rx_pkt_offset may legitimately see 0 as a valid offset now, so
switch to using USHRT_MAX to indicate an invalid offset.
Note also that I would generally prefer to replace the buffers of the
current sk_buff with a new kmalloc'd buffer of the right size, ditching the
old data and frags as this makes the handling of MSG_PEEK easier and
removes the re-decryption issue, but this looks like quite a complicated
thing to achieve. skb_morph() looks half way to what I want, but I don't
want to have to allocate a new sk_buff.
Fixes: d0d5c0cd1e ("rxrpc: Use skb_unshare() rather than skb_cow_data()")
Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/afKV2zGR6rrelPC7@v4bel/
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Tested-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515230516.2718212-3-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
The DATA-packet handler in rxrpc_input_call_event() and the RESPONSE
handler in rxrpc_verify_response() copy the skb to a linear one before
calling into the security ops only when skb_cloned() is true. An skb
that is not cloned but still carries externally-owned paged fragments
(e.g. SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG set by splice() into a UDP socket via
__ip_append_data, or a chained skb_has_frag_list()) falls through to
the in-place decryption path, which binds the frag pages directly into
the AEAD/skcipher SGL via skb_to_sgvec().
Extend the gate to also unshare when skb_has_frag_list() or
skb_has_shared_frag() is true. This catches the splice-loopback vector
and other externally-shared frag sources while preserving the
zero-copy fast path for skbs whose frags are kernel-private (e.g. NIC
page_pool RX, GRO). The OOM/trace handling already in place is reused.
Fixes: d0d5c0cd1e ("rxrpc: Use skb_unshare() rather than skb_cow_data()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
None of the udp_tunnel users need struct socket in their
fast paths; it is only used for tunnel setup / teardown.
Even setup_udp_tunnel_sock() does not need struct socket.
Let's change setup_udp_tunnel_sock() to take struct sock
instead of struct socket.
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260502031401.3557229-3-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
In rxrpc_preparse(), there are two paths for parsing key payloads: the
XDR path (for large payloads) and the non-XDR path (for payloads <= 28
bytes). While the XDR path (rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad()) correctly
validates the ticket length against AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX, the non-XDR
path fails to do so.
This allows an unprivileged user to provide a very large ticket length.
When this key is later read via rxrpc_read(), the total
token size (toksize) calculation results in a value that exceeds
AFSTOKEN_LENGTH_MAX, triggering a WARN_ON().
[ 2001.302904] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2108 at net/rxrpc/key.c:778 rxrpc_read+0x109/0x5c0 [rxrpc]
Fix this by adding a check in the non-XDR parsing path of rxrpc_preparse()
to ensure the ticket length does not exceed AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX,
bringing it into parity with the XDR parsing logic.
Fixes: 8a7a3eb4dd ("KEYS: RxRPC: Use key preparsing")
Fixes: 84924aac08 ("rxrpc: Fix checker warning")
Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422161438.2593376-7-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
The AF_RXRPC procfs helpers format local and remote socket addresses into
fixed 50-byte stack buffers with "%pISpc".
That is too small for the longest current-tree IPv6-with-port form the
formatter can produce. In lib/vsprintf.c, the compressed IPv6 path uses a
dotted-quad tail not only for v4mapped addresses, but also for ISATAP
addresses via ipv6_addr_is_isatap().
As a result, a case such as
[ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:0:5efe:255.255.255.255]:65535
is possible with the current formatter. That is 50 visible characters, so
51 bytes including the trailing NUL, which does not fit in the existing
char[50] buffers used by net/rxrpc/proc.c.
Size the buffers from the formatter's maximum textual form and switch the
call sites to scnprintf().
Changes since v1:
- correct the changelog to cite the actual maximum current-tree case
explicitly
- frame the proof around the ISATAP formatting path instead of the earlier
mapped-v4 example
Fixes: 75b54cb57c ("rxrpc: Add IPv6 support")
Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou <pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-22-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
An AF_RXRPC socket can be both client and server at the same time. When
sending new calls (ie. it's acting as a client), it uses rx->key to set the
security, and when accepting incoming calls (ie. it's acting as a server),
it uses rx->securities.
setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) sets rx->key to point to an rxrpc-type key
and setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING) sets rx->securities to point to a
keyring of rxrpc_s-type keys.
Now, it should be possible to use both rx->key and rx->securities on the
same socket - but for userspace AF_RXRPC sockets rxrpc_setsockopt()
prevents that.
Fix this by:
(1) Remove the incorrect check rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING)
makes on rx->key.
(2) Move the check that rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) makes on
rx->key down into rxrpc_request_key().
(3) Remove rxrpc_request_key()'s check on rx->securities.
This (in combination with a previous patch) pushes the checks down into the
functions that set those pointers and removes the cross-checks that prevent
both key and keyring being set.
Fixes: 17926a7932 ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
cc: Luxiao Xu <rakukuip@gmail.com>
cc: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-16-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
rxgk_verify_response() decodes auth_len from the packet and is supposed
to verify that it fits in the remaining bytes. The existing check is
inverted, so oversized RESPONSE authenticators are accepted and passed
to rxgk_decrypt_skb(), which can later reach skb_to_sgvec() with an
impossible length and hit BUG_ON(len).
Decoded from the original latest-net reproduction logs with
scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh:
RIP: __skb_to_sgvec()
[net/core/skbuff.c:5285 (discriminator 1)]
Call Trace:
skb_to_sgvec() [net/core/skbuff.c:5305]
rxgk_decrypt_skb() [net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h:81]
rxgk_verify_response() [net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1268]
rxrpc_process_connection()
[net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]
process_one_work() [kernel/workqueue.c:3281]
worker_thread()
[kernel/workqueue.c:3353 kernel/workqueue.c:3440]
kthread() [kernel/kthread.c:436]
ret_from_fork() [arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164]
Reject authenticator lengths that exceed the remaining packet payload.
Fixes: 9d1d2b5934 ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Signed-off-by: Keenan Dong <keenanat2000@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-14-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
rxgk_verify_authenticator() copies auth_len bytes into a temporary
buffer and then passes p + auth_len as the parser limit to
rxgk_do_verify_authenticator(). Since p is a __be32 *, that inflates the
parser end pointer by a factor of four and lets malformed RESPONSE
authenticators read past the kmalloc() buffer.
Decoded from the original latest-net reproduction logs with
scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rxgk_verify_response()
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl() [lib/dump_stack.c:123]
print_report() [mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482]
kasan_report() [mm/kasan/report.c:597]
rxgk_verify_response()
[net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1103 net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1167
net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1274]
rxrpc_process_connection()
[net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]
process_one_work() [kernel/workqueue.c:3281]
worker_thread()
[kernel/workqueue.c:3353 kernel/workqueue.c:3440]
kthread() [kernel/kthread.c:436]
ret_from_fork() [arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164]
Allocated by task 54:
rxgk_verify_response()
[include/linux/slab.h:954 net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1155
net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1274]
rxrpc_process_connection()
[net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]
Convert the byte count to __be32 units before constructing the parser
limit.
Fixes: 9d1d2b5934 ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Signed-off-by: Keenan Dong <keenanat2000@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-13-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
David Howells
Wyatt Feng
Jakub Kicinski
Li Daming
Hyunwoo Kim
Jeffrey Altman
Eric Biggers
Breno Leitao
Kuniyuki Iwashima
Anderson Nascimento
Pengpeng Hou
Wang Jie
Luxiao Xu
Keenan Dong
Yuqi Xu
Douya Le
Marc Dionne