[ Upstream commit 12a686c2e7 ]
This patch adds /proc/sys/net/core/mem_pcpu_rsv sysctl file,
to make SK_MEMORY_PCPU_RESERV tunable.
Commit 3cd3399dd7 ("net: implement per-cpu reserves for
memory_allocated") introduced per-cpu forward alloc cache:
"Implement a per-cpu cache of +1/-1 MB, to reduce number
of changes to sk->sk_prot->memory_allocated, which
would otherwise be cause of false sharing."
sk_prot->memory_allocated points to global atomic variable:
atomic_long_t tcp_memory_allocated ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
If increasing the per-cpu cache size from 1MB to e.g. 16MB,
changes to sk->sk_prot->memory_allocated can be further reduced.
Performance may be improved on system with many cores.
Signed-off-by: Adam Li <adamli@os.amperecomputing.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Lameter (Ampere) <cl@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Stable-dep-of: 3584718cf2 ("net: fix sk_memory_allocated_{add|sub} vs softirqs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5a1ccf0c72 ]
This patch introduces a new USB quirk,
USB_QUIRK_SHORT_SET_ADDRESS_REQ_TIMEOUT, which modifies the timeout value
for the SET_ADDRESS request. The standard timeout for USB request/command
is 5000 ms, as recommended in the USB 3.2 specification (section 9.2.6.1).
However, certain scenarios, such as connecting devices through an APTIV
hub, can lead to timeout errors when the device enumerates as full speed
initially and later switches to high speed during chirp negotiation.
In such cases, USB analyzer logs reveal that the bus suspends for
5 seconds due to incorrect chirp parsing and resumes only after two
consecutive timeout errors trigger a hub driver reset.
Packet(54) Dir(?) Full Speed J(997.100 us) Idle( 2.850 us)
_______| Time Stamp(28 . 105 910 682)
_______|_____________________________________________________________Ch0
Packet(55) Dir(?) Full Speed J(997.118 us) Idle( 2.850 us)
_______| Time Stamp(28 . 106 910 632)
_______|_____________________________________________________________Ch0
Packet(56) Dir(?) Full Speed J(399.650 us) Idle(222.582 us)
_______| Time Stamp(28 . 107 910 600)
_______|_____________________________________________________________Ch0
Packet(57) Dir Chirp J( 23.955 ms) Idle(115.169 ms)
_______| Time Stamp(28 . 108 532 832)
_______|_____________________________________________________________Ch0
Packet(58) Dir(?) Full Speed J (Suspend)( 5.347 sec) Idle( 5.366 us)
_______| Time Stamp(28 . 247 657 600)
_______|_____________________________________________________________Ch0
This 5-second delay in device enumeration is undesirable, particularly
in automotive applications where quick enumeration is crucial
(ideally within 3 seconds).
The newly introduced quirks provide the flexibility to align with a
3-second time limit, as required in specific contexts like automotive
applications.
By reducing the SET_ADDRESS request timeout to 500 ms, the
system can respond more swiftly to errors, initiate rapid recovery, and
ensure efficient device enumeration. This change is vital for scenarios
where rapid smartphone enumeration and screen projection are essential.
To use the quirk, please write "vendor_id:product_id:p" to
/sys/bus/usb/drivers/hub/module/parameter/quirks
For example,
echo "0x2c48:0x0132:p" > /sys/bus/usb/drivers/hub/module/parameters/quirks"
Signed-off-by: Hardik Gajjar <hgajjar@de.adit-jv.com>
Reviewed-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231027152029.104363-2-hgajjar@de.adit-jv.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 95a6ccbdc7 upstream.
BHI mitigation mode spectre_bhi=auto does not deploy the software
mitigation by default. In a cloud environment, it is a likely scenario
where userspace is trusted but the guests are not trusted. Deploying
system wide mitigation in such cases is not desirable.
Update the auto mode to unconditionally mitigate against malicious
guests. Deploy the software sequence at VMexit in auto mode also, when
hardware mitigation is not available. Unlike the force =on mode,
software sequence is not deployed at syscalls in auto mode.
Suggested-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ec9404e40e upstream.
Branch history clearing software sequences and hardware control
BHI_DIS_S were defined to mitigate Branch History Injection (BHI).
Add cmdline spectre_bhi={on|off|auto} to control BHI mitigation:
auto - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available.
on - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available,
otherwise deploy the software sequence at syscall entry and
VMexit.
off - Turn off BHI mitigation.
The default is auto mode which does not deploy the software sequence
mitigation. This is because of the hardening done in the syscall
dispatch path, which is the likely target of BHI.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e7862eda30 upstream.
The AMD Zen4 core supports a new feature called Automatic IBRS.
It is a "set-and-forget" feature that means that, like Intel's Enhanced IBRS,
h/w manages its IBRS mitigation resources automatically across CPL transitions.
The feature is advertised by CPUID_Fn80000021_EAX bit 8 and is enabled by
setting MSR C000_0080 (EFER) bit 21.
Enable Automatic IBRS by default if the CPU feature is present. It typically
provides greater performance over the incumbent generic retpolines mitigation.
Reuse the SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS spectre_v2_mitigation enum. AMD Automatic IBRS and
Intel Enhanced IBRS have similar enablement. Add NO_EIBRS_PBRSB to
cpu_vuln_whitelist, since AMD Automatic IBRS isn't affected by PBRSB-eIBRS.
The kernel command line option spectre_v2=eibrs is used to select AMD Automatic
IBRS, if available.
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124163319.2277355-8-kim.phillips@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8076fcde01 upstream.
RFDS is a CPU vulnerability that may allow userspace to infer kernel
stale data previously used in floating point registers, vector registers
and integer registers. RFDS only affects certain Intel Atom processors.
Intel released a microcode update that uses VERW instruction to clear
the affected CPU buffers. Unlike MDS, none of the affected cores support
SMT.
Add RFDS bug infrastructure and enable the VERW based mitigation by
default, that clears the affected buffers just before exiting to
userspace. Also add sysfs reporting and cmdline parameter
"reg_file_data_sampling" to control the mitigation.
For details see:
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 94b3f0b5af ]
The CSD lock seems to get stuck in 2 "modes". When it gets stuck
temporarily, it usually gets released in a few seconds, and sometimes
up to one or two minutes.
If the CSD lock stays stuck for more than several minutes, it never
seems to get unstuck, and gradually more and more things in the system
end up also getting stuck.
In the latter case, we should just give up, so the system can dump out
a little more information about what went wrong, and, with panic_on_oops
and a kdump kernel loaded, dump a whole bunch more information about what
might have gone wrong. In addition, there is an smp.panic_on_ipistall
kernel boot parameter that by default retains the old behavior, but when
set enables the panic after the CSD lock has been stuck for more than
the specified number of milliseconds, as in 300,000 for five minutes.
[ paulmck: Apply Imran Khan feedback. ]
[ paulmck: Apply Leonardo Bras feedback. ]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/bc7cc8b0-f587-4451-8bcd-0daae627bcc7@paulmck-laptop/
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Imran Khan <imran.f.khan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Leonardo Bras <leobras@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 4597648fdd upstream.
This reverts commits 86327e8eb9 ("memcg: drop kmem.limit_in_bytes") and
partially reverts 58056f7750 ("memcg, kmem: further deprecate
kmem.limit_in_bytes") which have incrementally removed support for the
kernel memory accounting hard limit. Unfortunately it has turned out that
there is still userspace depending on the existence of
memory.kmem.limit_in_bytes [1]. The underlying functionality is not
really required but the non-existent file just confuses the userspace
which fails in the result. The patch to fix this on the userspace side
has been submitted but it is hard to predict how it will propagate through
the maze of 3rd party consumers of the software.
Now, reverting alone 86327e8eb9 is not an option because there is
another set of userspace which cannot cope with ENOTSUPP returned when
writing to the file. Therefore we have to go and revisit 58056f7750 as
well. There are two ways to go ahead. Either we give up on the
deprecation and fully revert 58056f7750 as well or we can keep
kmem.limit_in_bytes but make the write a noop and warn about the fact.
This should work for both known breaking workloads which depend on the
existence but do not depend on the hard limit enforcement.
Note to backporters to stable trees. a8c49af3be ("memcg: add per-memcg
total kernel memory stat") introduced in 4.18 has added memcg_account_kmem
so the accounting is not done by obj_cgroup_charge_pages directly for v1
anymore. Prior kernels need to add it explicitly (thanks to Johannes for
pointing this out).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build - remove unused local]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230920081101.GA12096@linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net [1]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ZRE5VJozPZt9bRPy@dhcp22.suse.cz
Fixes: 86327e8eb9 ("memcg: drop kmem.limit_in_bytes")
Fixes: 58056f7750 ("memcg, kmem: further deprecate kmem.limit_in_bytes")
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Tejun heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 86327e8eb9 upstream.
kmem.limit_in_bytes (v1 way to limit kernel memory usage) has been
deprecated since 58056f7750 ("memcg, kmem: further deprecate
kmem.limit_in_bytes") merged in 5.16. We haven't heard about any serious
users since then but it seems that the mere presence of the file is
causing more harm thatn good. We (SUSE) have had several bug reports from
customers where Docker based containers started to fail because a write to
kmem.limit_in_bytes has failed.
This was unexpected because runc code only expects ENOENT (kmem disabled)
or EBUSY (tasks already running within cgroup). So a new error code was
unexpected and the whole container startup failed. This has been later
addressed by
https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/52390d68040637dfc77f9fda6bbe70952423d380
so current Docker runtimes do not suffer from the problem anymore. There
are still older version of Docker in use and likely hard to get rid of
completely.
Address this by wiping out the file completely and effectively get back to
pre 4.5 era and CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM=n configuration.
I would recommend backporting to stable trees which have picked up
58056f7750 ("memcg, kmem: further deprecate kmem.limit_in_bytes").
[mhocko@suse.com: restore _KMEM switch case]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ZKe5wxdbvPi5Cwd7@dhcp22.suse.cz
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230704115240.14672-1-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 86327e8eb9 upstream.
kmem.limit_in_bytes (v1 way to limit kernel memory usage) has been
deprecated since 58056f7750 ("memcg, kmem: further deprecate
kmem.limit_in_bytes") merged in 5.16. We haven't heard about any serious
users since then but it seems that the mere presence of the file is
causing more harm thatn good. We (SUSE) have had several bug reports from
customers where Docker based containers started to fail because a write to
kmem.limit_in_bytes has failed.
This was unexpected because runc code only expects ENOENT (kmem disabled)
or EBUSY (tasks already running within cgroup). So a new error code was
unexpected and the whole container startup failed. This has been later
addressed by
https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/52390d68040637dfc77f9fda6bbe70952423d380
so current Docker runtimes do not suffer from the problem anymore. There
are still older version of Docker in use and likely hard to get rid of
completely.
Address this by wiping out the file completely and effectively get back to
pre 4.5 era and CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM=n configuration.
I would recommend backporting to stable trees which have picked up
58056f7750 ("memcg, kmem: further deprecate kmem.limit_in_bytes").
[mhocko@suse.com: restore _KMEM switch case]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ZKe5wxdbvPi5Cwd7@dhcp22.suse.cz
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230704115240.14672-1-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5f641174a1 upstream.
The `nocrt` module parameter has no code associated with it and does
nothing. As `crt=-1` has same functionality as what nocrt should be
doing drop `nocrt` and associated documentation.
This should fix a quirk for Gigabyte GA-7ZX that used `nocrt` and
thus didn't function properly.
Fixes: 8c99fdce30 ("ACPI: thermal: set "thermal.nocrt" via DMI on Gigabyte GA-7ZX")
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 66419036f6 ]
An Interrupt Remapping Table (IRT) stores interrupt remapping configuration
for each device. In a normal operation, the AMD IOMMU caches the table
to optimize subsequent data accesses. This requires the IOMMU driver to
invalidate IRT whenever it updates the table. The invalidation process
includes issuing an INVALIDATE_INTERRUPT_TABLE command following by
a COMPLETION_WAIT command.
However, there are cases in which the IRT is updated at a high rate.
For example, for IOMMU AVIC, the IRTE[IsRun] bit is updated on every
vcpu scheduling (i.e. amd_iommu_update_ga()). On system with large
amount of vcpus and VFIO PCI pass-through devices, the invalidation
process could potentially become a performance bottleneck.
Introducing a new kernel boot option:
amd_iommu=irtcachedis
which disables IRTE caching by setting the IRTCachedis bit in each IOMMU
Control register, and bypass the IRT invalidation process.
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Alejandro Jimenez <alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Jimenez <alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230530141137.14376-4-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Upstream commit: fb3bd914b3
Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow
vulnerability found on AMD processors.
The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to
a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the
retpoline sequence. To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces
the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return'
sequence.
To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the
safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference. In Zen3
and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the
untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return
function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially
poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns.
In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation
technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and
srso_safe_ret().
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 553a5c03e9 upstream
The Gather Data Sampling (GDS) vulnerability allows malicious software
to infer stale data previously stored in vector registers. This may
include sensitive data such as cryptographic keys. GDS is mitigated in
microcode, and systems with up-to-date microcode are protected by
default. However, any affected system that is running with older
microcode will still be vulnerable to GDS attacks.
Since the gather instructions used by the attacker are part of the
AVX2 and AVX512 extensions, disabling these extensions prevents gather
instructions from being executed, thereby mitigating the system from
GDS. Disabling AVX2 is sufficient, but we don't have the granularity
to do this. The XCR0[2] disables AVX, with no option to just disable
AVX2.
Add a kernel parameter gather_data_sampling=force that will enable the
microcode mitigation if available, otherwise it will disable AVX on
affected systems.
This option will be ignored if cmdline mitigations=off.
This is a *big* hammer. It is known to break buggy userspace that
uses incomplete, buggy AVX enumeration. Unfortunately, such userspace
does exist in the wild:
https://www.mail-archive.com/bug-coreutils@gnu.org/msg33046.html
[ dhansen: add some more ominous warnings about disabling AVX ]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8974eb5882 upstream
Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
vector registers.
Intel processors that support AVX2 and AVX512 have gather instructions
that fetch non-contiguous data elements from memory. On vulnerable
hardware, when a gather instruction is transiently executed and
encounters a fault, stale data from architectural or internal vector
registers may get transiently stored to the destination vector
register allowing an attacker to infer the stale data using typical
side channel techniques like cache timing attacks.
This mitigation is different from many earlier ones for two reasons.
First, it is enabled by default and a bit must be set to *DISABLE* it.
This is the opposite of normal mitigation polarity. This means GDS can
be mitigated simply by updating microcode and leaving the new control
bit alone.
Second, GDS has a "lock" bit. This lock bit is there because the
mitigation affects the hardware security features KeyLocker and SGX.
It needs to be enabled and *STAY* enabled for these features to be
mitigated against GDS.
The mitigation is enabled in the microcode by default. Disable it by
setting gather_data_sampling=off or by disabling all mitigations with
mitigations=off. The mitigation status can be checked by reading:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3c1897ae4b upstream.
The kernel security team does NOT assign CVEs, so document that properly
and provide the "if you want one, ask MITRE for it" response that we
give on a weekly basis in the document, so we don't have to constantly
say it to everyone who asks.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2023063022-retouch-kerosene-7e4a@gregkh
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4fee0915e6 upstream.
Because the linux-distros group forces reporters to release information
about reported bugs, and they impose arbitrary deadlines in having those
bugs fixed despite not actually being kernel developers, the kernel
security team recommends not interacting with them at all as this just
causes confusion and the early-release of reported security problems.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2023063020-throat-pantyhose-f110@gregkh
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 035641b01e upstream.
Just calling wait_for_device_probe() is not enough to ensure that
asynchronously probed block devices are available (E.G. mmc, usb), so
add a "dm-mod.waitfor=<device1>[,..,<deviceN>]" parameter to get
dm-init to explicitly wait for specific block devices before
initializing the tables with logic similar to the rootwait logic that
was introduced with commit cc1ed7542c ("init: wait for
asynchronously scanned block devices").
E.G. with dm-verity on mmc using:
dm-mod.waitfor="PARTLABEL=hash-a,PARTLABEL=root-a"
[ 0.671671] device-mapper: init: waiting for all devices to be available before creating mapped devices
[ 0.671679] device-mapper: init: waiting for device PARTLABEL=hash-a ...
[ 0.710695] mmc0: new HS200 MMC card at address 0001
[ 0.711158] mmcblk0: mmc0:0001 004GA0 3.69 GiB
[ 0.715954] mmcblk0boot0: mmc0:0001 004GA0 partition 1 2.00 MiB
[ 0.722085] mmcblk0boot1: mmc0:0001 004GA0 partition 2 2.00 MiB
[ 0.728093] mmcblk0rpmb: mmc0:0001 004GA0 partition 3 512 KiB, chardev (249:0)
[ 0.738274] mmcblk0: p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7
[ 0.751282] device-mapper: init: waiting for device PARTLABEL=root-a ...
[ 0.751306] device-mapper: init: all devices available
[ 0.751683] device-mapper: verity: sha256 using implementation "sha256-generic"
[ 0.759344] device-mapper: ioctl: dm-0 (vroot) is ready
[ 0.766540] VFS: Mounted root (squashfs filesystem) readonly on device 254:0.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark-PK Tsai <mark-pk.tsai@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit da34a8484d upstream.
Charge moving mode in cgroup1 allows memory to follow tasks as they
migrate between cgroups. This is, and always has been, a questionable
thing to do - for several reasons.
First, it's expensive. Pages need to be identified, locked and isolated
from various MM operations, and reassigned, one by one.
Second, it's unreliable. Once pages are charged to a cgroup, there isn't
always a clear owner task anymore. Cache isn't moved at all, for example.
Mapped memory is moved - but if trylocking or isolating a page fails,
it's arbitrarily left behind. Frequent moving between domains may leave a
task's memory scattered all over the place.
Third, it isn't really needed. Launcher tasks can kick off workload tasks
directly in their target cgroup. Using dedicated per-workload groups
allows fine-grained policy adjustments - no need to move tasks and their
physical pages between control domains. The feature was never
forward-ported to cgroup2, and it hasn't been missed.
Despite it being a niche usecase, the maintenance overhead of supporting
it is enormous. Because pages are moved while they are live and subject
to various MM operations, the synchronization rules are complicated.
There are lock_page_memcg() in MM and FS code, which non-cgroup people
don't understand. In some cases we've been able to shift code and cgroup
API calls around such that we can rely on native locking as much as
possible. But that's fragile, and sometimes we need to hold MM locks for
longer than we otherwise would (pte lock e.g.).
Mark the feature deprecated. Hopefully we can remove it soon.
And backport into -stable kernels so that people who develop against
earlier kernels are warned about this deprecation as early as possible.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix memory.rst underlining]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/Y5COd+qXwk/S+n8N@cmpxchg.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d4ccd54d28 upstream.
Many Linux systems are configured to not panic on oops; but allowing an
attacker to oops the system **really** often can make even bugs that look
completely unexploitable exploitable (like NULL dereferences and such) if
each crash elevates a refcount by one or a lock is taken in read mode, and
this causes a counter to eventually overflow.
The most interesting counters for this are 32 bits wide (like open-coded
refcounts that don't use refcount_t). (The ldsem reader count on 32-bit
platforms is just 16 bits, but probably nobody cares about 32-bit platforms
that much nowadays.)
So let's panic the system if the kernel is constantly oopsing.
The speed of oopsing 2^32 times probably depends on several factors, like
how long the stack trace is and which unwinder you're using; an empirically
important one is whether your console is showing a graphical environment or
a text console that oopses will be printed to.
In a quick single-threaded benchmark, it looks like oopsing in a vfork()
child with a very short stack trace only takes ~510 microseconds per run
when a graphical console is active; but switching to a text console that
oopses are printed to slows it down around 87x, to ~45 milliseconds per
run.
(Adding more threads makes this faster, but the actual oops printing
happens under &die_lock on x86, so you can maybe speed this up by a factor
of around 2 and then any further improvement gets eaten up by lock
contention.)
It looks like it would take around 8-12 days to overflow a 32-bit counter
with repeated oopsing on a multi-core X86 system running a graphical
environment; both me (in an X86 VM) and Seth (with a distro kernel on
normal hardware in a standard configuration) got numbers in that ballpark.
12 days aren't *that* short on a desktop system, and you'd likely need much
longer on a typical server system (assuming that people don't run graphical
desktop environments on their servers), and this is a *very* noisy and
violent approach to exploiting the kernel; and it also seems to take orders
of magnitude longer on some machines, probably because stuff like EFI
pstore will slow it down a ton if that's active.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221107201317.324457-1-jannh@google.com
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117234328.594699-2-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 727209376f ]
Commit b041b525da ("x86/split_lock: Make life miserable for split lockers")
changed the way the split lock detector works when in "warn" mode;
basically, it not only shows the warn message, but also intentionally
introduces a slowdown through sleeping plus serialization mechanism
on such task. Based on discussions in [0], seems the warning alone
wasn't enough motivation for userspace developers to fix their
applications.
This slowdown is enough to totally break some proprietary (aka.
unfixable) userspace[1].
Happens that originally the proposal in [0] was to add a new mode
which would warns + slowdown the "split locking" task, keeping the
old warn mode untouched. In the end, that idea was discarded and
the regular/default "warn" mode now slows down the applications. This
is quite aggressive with regards proprietary/legacy programs that
basically are unable to properly run in kernel with this change.
While it is understandable that a malicious application could DoS
by split locking, it seems unacceptable to regress old/proprietary
userspace programs through a default configuration that previously
worked. An example of such breakage was reported in [1].
Add a sysctl to allow controlling the "misery mode" behavior, as per
Thomas suggestion on [2]. This way, users running legacy and/or
proprietary software are allowed to still execute them with a decent
performance while still observing the warning messages on kernel log.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220217012721.9694-1-tony.luck@intel.com/
[1] https://github.com/doitsujin/dxvk/issues/2938
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87pmf4bter.ffs@tglx/
[ dhansen: minor changelog tweaks, including clarifying the actual
problem ]
Fixes: b041b525da ("x86/split_lock: Make life miserable for split lockers")
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Tested-by: Andre Almeida <andrealmeid@igalia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221024200254.635256-1-gpiccoli%40igalia.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Add a new amd pstate driver command line option to enable driver passive
working mode via MSR and shared memory interface to request desired
performance within abstract scale and the power management firmware
(SMU) convert the perf requests into actual hardware pstates.
Also the `disable` parameter can disable the pstate driver loading by
adding `amd_pstate=disable` to kernel command line.
Acked-by: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Gautham R. Shenoy <gautham.shenoy@amd.com>
Tested-by: Wyes Karny <wyes.karny@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Perry Yuan <Perry.Yuan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Introduce the `amd_pstate` driver new working mode with
`amd_pstate=passive` added to kernel command line.
If there is no passive mode enabled by user, amd_pstate driver will be
disabled by default for now.
Acked-by: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Gautham R. Shenoy <gautham.shenoy@amd.com>
Tested-by: Wyes Karny <wyes.karny@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Perry Yuan <Perry.Yuan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
The example on how to use and test Capture Overlay specified
the wrong video device node. Back in 2015 the loop_video control
moved from the output device to the capture device, but this
example code is still referring to the output video device.
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Pull ACPI fixes from Rafael Wysocki:
"These fix issues introduced during this merge window (ACPI/PCI, device
enumeration and documentation) and some other ones found recently.
Specifics:
- Add missing device reference counting to acpi_get_pci_dev() after
changing it recently (Rafael Wysocki)
- Fix resource list walk in acpi_dma_get_range() (Robin Murphy)
- Add IRQ override quirk for LENOVO IdeaPad and extend the IRQ
override warning message (Jiri Slaby)
- Fix integer overflow in ghes_estatus_pool_init() (Ashish Kalra)
- Fix multiple error records handling in one of the ACPI extlog
driver code paths (Tony Luck)
- Prune DSDT override documentation from index after dropping it
(Bagas Sanjaya)"
* tag 'acpi-6.1-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm:
ACPI: scan: Fix DMA range assignment
ACPI: PCI: Fix device reference counting in acpi_get_pci_dev()
ACPI: resource: note more about IRQ override
ACPI: resource: do IRQ override on LENOVO IdeaPad
ACPI: extlog: Handle multiple records
ACPI: APEI: Fix integer overflow in ghes_estatus_pool_init()
Documentation: ACPI: Prune DSDT override documentation from index
Merge assorted ACPI fixes for 6.1-rc2:
- Fix resource list walk in acpi_dma_get_range() (Robin Murphy).
- Add IRQ override quirk for LENOVO IdeaPad and extend the IRQ
override warning message (Jiri Slaby).
- Fix integer overflow in ghes_estatus_pool_init() (Ashish Kalra).
- Fix multiple error records handling in one of the ACPI extlog driver
code paths (Tony Luck).
- Prune DSDT override documentation from index after dropping it (Bagas
Sanjaya).
* acpi-scan:
ACPI: scan: Fix DMA range assignment
* acpi-resource:
ACPI: resource: note more about IRQ override
ACPI: resource: do IRQ override on LENOVO IdeaPad
* acpi-apei:
ACPI: APEI: Fix integer overflow in ghes_estatus_pool_init()
* acpi-extlog:
ACPI: extlog: Handle multiple records
* acpi-docs:
Documentation: ACPI: Prune DSDT override documentation from index
Add documentation that was missing from commit 5721d4e5a9 ("dm
verity: Add optional "try_verify_in_tasklet" feature").
Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Pull PSI updates from Ingo Molnar:
- Various performance optimizations, resulting in a 4%-9% speedup in
the mmtests/config-scheduler-perfpipe micro-benchmark.
- New interface to turn PSI on/off on a per cgroup level.
* tag 'sched-psi-2022-10-14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
sched/psi: Per-cgroup PSI accounting disable/re-enable interface
sched/psi: Cache parent psi_group to speed up group iteration
sched/psi: Consolidate cgroup_psi()
sched/psi: Add PSI_IRQ to track IRQ/SOFTIRQ pressure
sched/psi: Remove NR_ONCPU task accounting
sched/psi: Optimize task switch inside shared cgroups again
sched/psi: Move private helpers to sched/stats.h
sched/psi: Save percpu memory when !psi_cgroups_enabled
sched/psi: Don't create cgroup PSI files when psi_disabled
sched/psi: Fix periodic aggregation shut off
Commit d206cef03c ("ACPI: docs: Drop useless DSDT override documentation")
removes useless DSDT override documentation. However, the commit forgets
to prune the documentation entry from table of contents of ACPI admin
guide documentation, hence triggers Sphinx warning:
Documentation/admin-guide/acpi/index.rst:8: WARNING: toctree contains reference to nonexisting document 'admin-guide/acpi/dsdt-override'
Prune the entry to fix the warning.
Fixes: d206cef03c ("ACPI: docs: Drop useless DSDT override documentation")
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Pull xen updates from Juergen Gross:
- Some minor typo fixes
- A fix of the Xen pcifront driver for supporting the device model to
run in a Linux stub domain
- A cleanup of the pcifront driver
- A series to enable grant-based virtio with Xen on x86
- A cleanup of Xen PV guests to distinguish between safe and faulting
MSR accesses
- Two fixes of the Xen gntdev driver
- Two fixes of the new xen grant DMA driver
* tag 'for-linus-6.1-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
xen: Kconfig: Fix spelling mistake "Maxmium" -> "Maximum"
xen/pv: support selecting safe/unsafe msr accesses
xen/pv: refactor msr access functions to support safe and unsafe accesses
xen/pv: fix vendor checks for pmu emulation
xen/pv: add fault recovery control to pmu msr accesses
xen/virtio: enable grant based virtio on x86
xen/virtio: use dom0 as default backend for CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO_FORCE_GRANT
xen/virtio: restructure xen grant dma setup
xen/pcifront: move xenstore config scanning into sub-function
xen/gntdev: Accommodate VMA splitting
xen/gntdev: Prevent leaking grants
xen/virtio: Fix potential deadlock when accessing xen_grant_dma_devices
xen/virtio: Fix n_pages calculation in xen_grant_dma_map(unmap)_page()
xen/xenbus: Fix spelling mistake "hardward" -> "hardware"
xen-pcifront: Handle missed Connected state
Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:
- hfs and hfsplus kmap API modernization (Fabio Francesco)
- make crash-kexec work properly when invoked from an NMI-time panic
(Valentin Schneider)
- ntfs bugfixes (Hawkins Jiawei)
- improve IPC msg scalability by replacing atomic_t's with percpu
counters (Jiebin Sun)
- nilfs2 cleanups (Minghao Chi)
- lots of other single patches all over the tree!
* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2022-10-11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (71 commits)
include/linux/entry-common.h: remove has_signal comment of arch_do_signal_or_restart() prototype
proc: test how it holds up with mapping'less process
mailmap: update Frank Rowand email address
ia64: mca: use strscpy() is more robust and safer
init/Kconfig: fix unmet direct dependencies
ia64: update config files
nilfs2: replace WARN_ONs by nilfs_error for checkpoint acquisition failure
fork: remove duplicate included header files
init/main.c: remove unnecessary (void*) conversions
proc: mark more files as permanent
nilfs2: remove the unneeded result variable
nilfs2: delete unnecessary checks before brelse()
checkpatch: warn for non-standard fixes tag style
usr/gen_init_cpio.c: remove unnecessary -1 values from int file
ipc/msg: mitigate the lock contention with percpu counter
percpu: add percpu_counter_add_local and percpu_counter_sub_local
fs/ocfs2: fix repeated words in comments
relay: use kvcalloc to alloc page array in relay_alloc_page_array
proc: make config PROC_CHILDREN depend on PROC_FS
fs: uninline inode_maybe_inc_iversion()
...
Instead of always doing the safe variants for reading and writing MSRs
in Xen PV guests, make the behavior controllable via Kconfig option
and a boot parameter.
The default will be the current behavior, which is to always use the
safe variant.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Thomas Weißschuh
Adam Li
Hardik Gajjar
Josh Poimboeuf
Pawan Gupta
Kim Phillips
Borislav Petkov (AMD)
Vegard Nossum
Rik van Riel
Michal Hocko
Greg Kroah-Hartman
Mario Limonciello
Peter Zijlstra
Suravee Suthikulpanit
Dave Hansen
Daniel Sneddon
Peter Korsgaard
Johannes Weiner
John Ogness
KP Singh
Yicong Yang
Tom Lendacky
Kees Cook
Jann Horn
Guilherme G. Piccoli
Perry Yuan
Hans Verkuil
Linus Torvalds
Rafael J. Wysocki
Milan Broz
Bagas Sanjaya
Juergen Gross