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John Johansen 3d28e2397a apparmor: add support loading per permission tagging
Add support for the per permission tag index for a given permission
set. This will be used by both meta-data tagging, to allow annotating
accept states with context and debug information. As well as by rule
tainting and triggers to specify the taint or trigger to be applied.

Since these are low frequency ancillary data items they are stored
in a tighter packed format to that allows for sharing and reuse of the
strings between permissions and accept states. Reducing the amount of
kernel memory use at the cost of having to go through a couple if
index based indirections.

The tags are just strings that has no meaning with out context. When
used as meta-data for auditing and debugging its entirely information
for userspace, but triggers, and tainting can be used to affect the
domain. However they all exist in the same packed data set and can
be shared between different uses.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2026-01-29 01:27:47 -08:00

213 lines
4.9 KiB
C

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
/*
* AppArmor security module
*
* This file contains AppArmor auditing function definitions.
*
* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
* Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
*/
#ifndef __AA_AUDIT_H
#define __AA_AUDIT_H
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include "file.h"
#include "label.h"
extern const char *const audit_mode_names[];
#define AUDIT_MAX_INDEX 5
enum audit_mode {
AUDIT_NORMAL, /* follow normal auditing of accesses */
AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED, /* quiet all denied access messages */
AUDIT_QUIET, /* quiet all messages */
AUDIT_NOQUIET, /* do not quiet audit messages */
AUDIT_ALL /* audit all accesses */
};
enum audit_type {
AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT,
AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED,
AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED,
AUDIT_APPARMOR_HINT,
AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS,
AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR,
AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL,
AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO
};
#define OP_NULL NULL
#define OP_SYSCTL "sysctl"
#define OP_CAPABLE "capable"
#define OP_UNLINK "unlink"
#define OP_MKDIR "mkdir"
#define OP_RMDIR "rmdir"
#define OP_MKNOD "mknod"
#define OP_TRUNC "truncate"
#define OP_LINK "link"
#define OP_SYMLINK "symlink"
#define OP_RENAME_SRC "rename_src"
#define OP_RENAME_DEST "rename_dest"
#define OP_CHMOD "chmod"
#define OP_CHOWN "chown"
#define OP_GETATTR "getattr"
#define OP_OPEN "open"
#define OP_FRECEIVE "file_receive"
#define OP_FPERM "file_perm"
#define OP_FLOCK "file_lock"
#define OP_FMMAP "file_mmap"
#define OP_FMPROT "file_mprotect"
#define OP_INHERIT "file_inherit"
#define OP_PIVOTROOT "pivotroot"
#define OP_MOUNT "mount"
#define OP_UMOUNT "umount"
#define OP_CREATE "create"
#define OP_POST_CREATE "post_create"
#define OP_BIND "bind"
#define OP_CONNECT "connect"
#define OP_LISTEN "listen"
#define OP_ACCEPT "accept"
#define OP_SENDMSG "sendmsg"
#define OP_RECVMSG "recvmsg"
#define OP_GETSOCKNAME "getsockname"
#define OP_GETPEERNAME "getpeername"
#define OP_GETSOCKOPT "getsockopt"
#define OP_SETSOCKOPT "setsockopt"
#define OP_SHUTDOWN "socket_shutdown"
#define OP_PTRACE "ptrace"
#define OP_SIGNAL "signal"
#define OP_EXEC "exec"
#define OP_CHANGE_HAT "change_hat"
#define OP_CHANGE_PROFILE "change_profile"
#define OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC "change_onexec"
#define OP_STACK "stack"
#define OP_STACK_ONEXEC "stack_onexec"
#define OP_SETPROCATTR "setprocattr"
#define OP_SETRLIMIT "setrlimit"
#define OP_PROF_REPL "profile_replace"
#define OP_PROF_LOAD "profile_load"
#define OP_PROF_RM "profile_remove"
#define OP_USERNS_CREATE "userns_create"
#define OP_URING_OVERRIDE "uring_override"
#define OP_URING_SQPOLL "uring_sqpoll"
struct apparmor_audit_data {
int error;
int type;
u16 class;
const char *op;
const struct cred *subj_cred;
struct aa_label *subj_label;
const char *name;
const char *info;
u32 request;
u32 denied;
u32 tags;
union {
/* these entries require a custom callback fn */
struct {
struct aa_label *peer;
union {
struct {
const char *target;
kuid_t ouid;
} fs;
struct {
int rlim;
unsigned long max;
} rlim;
struct {
int signal;
int unmappedsig;
};
struct {
int type, protocol;
void *addr;
int addrlen;
struct {
void *addr;
int addrlen;
} peer;
} net;
};
};
struct {
struct aa_profile *profile;
const char *ns;
long pos;
} iface;
struct {
const char *src_name;
const char *type;
const char *trans;
const char *data;
unsigned long flags;
} mnt;
struct {
struct aa_label *target;
} uring;
};
struct common_audit_data common;
};
/* macros for dealing with apparmor_audit_data structure */
#define aad(SA) (container_of(SA, struct apparmor_audit_data, common))
#define aad_of_va(VA) aad((struct common_audit_data *)(VA))
#define DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME, T, C, X) \
/* TODO: cleanup audit init so we don't need _aad = {0,} */ \
struct apparmor_audit_data NAME = { \
.class = (C), \
.op = (X), \
.common.type = (T), \
.common.u.tsk = NULL, \
.common.apparmor_audit_data = &NAME, \
};
void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *));
int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile,
struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *));
#define aa_audit_error(ERROR, AD, CB) \
({ \
(AD)->error = (ERROR); \
aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR, (AD), (CB)); \
(AD)->error; \
})
static inline int complain_error(int error)
{
if (error == -EPERM || error == -EACCES)
return 0;
return error;
}
void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule);
int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp);
int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule);
int aa_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule);
#endif /* __AA_AUDIT_H */