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[ Upstream commit0895a000e4] The user.* sysctls implement the ctl_table_root::permissions hook and they override the file access mode based on the CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capability (at most rwx if capable, at most r-- if not). The capability is being checked unconditionally, so if an LSM denies the capability, an audit record may be logged even when access is in fact granted. Given the logic in the set_permissions() function in kernel/ucount.c and the unfortunate way the permission checking is implemented, it doesn't seem viable to avoid false positive denials by deferring the capability check. Thus, do the same as in net_ctl_permissions() (net/sysctl_net.c) - switch from ns_capable() to ns_capable_noaudit(), so that the check never logs an audit record. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260122140745.239428-1-omosnace@redhat.com Fixes:dbec28460a("userns: Add per user namespace sysctls.") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>