While auditing the Linux 7.0-rc2 kernel, I identified a potential security
vulnerability in the iov_iter framework's memory allocation logic.
The dup_iter() function, which is exported via EXPORT_SYMBOL, currently
uses kmemdup() with a raw multiplication to allocate the duplicate iovec array:
new->iov = kmemdup(from->iov, nr_segs * sizeof(struct iovec), gfp);
The hazard here is that dup_iter() relies on a primitive multiplication without
any integrated overflow check. Since nr_segs is often derived from user-space
input, this line is vulnerable to integer overflow (on 32-bit systems or
via type narrowing), potentially leading to a small allocation followed by a
large out-of-bounds memory copy. Furthermore, it allows for unbounded memory
allocations, as the function lacks intrinsic knowledge of safe limits.
On the 7.0-rc2 branch, several high-impact callchains still rely on this
exported function:
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c:
The ffs_epfile_read_iter() path demonstrates why relying on dup_iter() is
dangerous: it performs allocation based on user input before verifying driver
state. This confirms that dup_iter() must be hardened internally as it cannot
assume pre-validated input.
drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c:
The ep_read_iter() path illustrates how dup_iter()’s lack of boundary awareness
compounds resource risks. When combined with other allocations, it creates
a multiplier effect for kernel memory pressure.
This patch replaces kmemdup() with kmemdup_array(), which utilizes
check_mul_overflow() to ensure the allocation size is calculated safely,
hardening dup_iter() against malicious or malformed inputs from its callers
Signed-off-by: Wang Haoran <haoranwangsec@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260413060655.1139141-1-haoranwangsec@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Wang Haoran
30beced6ec