audit: fix potential integer overflow in audit_log_n_hex()

[ Upstream commit 65dfde57d1 ]

The function calculates new_len as len << 1 for hex encoding. This
has two overflow risks: the shift itself can overflow when len is
large, and the result can be truncated when assigned to new_len
(declared as int) from the size_t calculation.

Fix by using check_shl_overflow() to catch shift overflow and
changing new_len and loop counter i to size_t to prevent truncation.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 168b717395 ("AUDIT: Clean up logging of untrusted strings")
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Robaina <rrobaina@redhat.com>
[PM: remove vertical whitspace noise]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

kernel/audit.c

@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
 #include <net/netns/generic.h>
 #include <net/ip.h>
 #include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/overflow.h>
 
 #include "audit.h"
 
@@ -2034,7 +2035,8 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...)
 void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf,
 		size_t len)
 {
-	int i, avail, new_len;
+	int avail;
+	size_t i, new_len;
 	unsigned char *ptr;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 
@@ -2044,7 +2046,12 @@ void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf,
 	BUG_ON(!ab->skb);
 	skb = ab->skb;
 	avail = skb_tailroom(skb);
-	new_len = len<<1;
+
+	if (check_shl_overflow(len, 1, &new_len)) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, "?");
+		return;
+	}
+
 	if (new_len >= avail) {
 		/* Round the buffer request up to the next multiple */
 		new_len = AUDIT_BUFSIZ*(((new_len-avail)/AUDIT_BUFSIZ) + 1);