libceph: Fix multiplication overflow in decode_new_up_state_weight()

commit 98917a499e upstream.

If a message of type CEPH_MSG_OSD_MAP contains a (maliciously) corrupted
osdmap, out-of-bounds memory accesses may occur in
decode_new_up_state_weight(). This happens because the bounds check for
the new_state part is based on calculating its length depending on a len
value read from the incoming message. This calculation may overflow
leading to an incorrect bounds check. Subsequently, out-of-bounds reads
may occur when decoding this part.

This patch switches the multiplication to use check_mul_overflow() to
abort processing the osdmap if an overflow occurred. Therefore,
osdmaps/messages containing large values for len that result in a
multiplication overflow are treated as invalid.

[ idryomov: rename new_state_len -> new_state_item_size, formatting ]

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 930c532869 ("libceph: apply new_state before new_up_client on incrementals")
Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer@tu-ilmenau.de>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Raphael Zimmer
2026-08-03 11:22:02 +02:00
committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 4e7ebfaa0d
commit 1732d89dfc
+4 -1
View File
@@ -1844,6 +1844,8 @@ static int decode_new_up_state_weight(void **p, void *end, u8 struct_v,
void *new_up_client;
void *new_state;
void *new_weight_end;
const u32 new_state_item_size =
sizeof(u32) + (struct_v >= 5 ? sizeof(u32) : sizeof(u8));
u32 len;
int ret;
int i;
@@ -1864,7 +1866,8 @@ static int decode_new_up_state_weight(void **p, void *end, u8 struct_v,
new_state = *p;
ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, e_inval);
len *= sizeof(u32) + (struct_v >= 5 ? sizeof(u32) : sizeof(u8));
if (check_mul_overflow(len, new_state_item_size, &len))
goto e_inval;
ceph_decode_need(p, end, len, e_inval);
*p += len;