ksmbd: fix integer overflow in set_file_allocation_info()

commit 1c0ae3df69 upstream.

set_file_allocation_info() converts the client-supplied
FILE_ALLOCATION_INFORMATION::AllocationSize into a 512-byte block
count with:

	alloc_blks = (le64_to_cpu(file_alloc_info->AllocationSize) + 511) >> 9;

AllocationSize is a fully client-controlled __le64 field; the only
validation performed by the caller (smb2_set_info_file(), case
FILE_ALLOCATION_INFORMATION) is that the fixed buffer is at least
sizeof(struct smb2_file_alloc_info) == 8 bytes. The value itself is
never range-checked before this arithmetic.

When AllocationSize is close to U64_MAX (e.g. 0xffffffffffffffff),
"AllocationSize + 511" wraps around mod 2^64 to a small number
(0xffffffffffffffff + 511 = 510), so alloc_blks becomes 0. Since any
existing regular file has stat.blocks > 0, the function then takes
the "shrink" branch and calls:

	ksmbd_vfs_truncate(work, fp, alloc_blks * 512);   /* == 0 */

silently truncating the file to size 0, even though the client asked
to grow the allocation to (what looks like) the maximum possible
size. The trailing "if (size < alloc_blks * 512) i_size_write(inode,
size);" restore is guarded by a comparison that is never true once
alloc_blks == 0, so the truncation is not undone. This lets an
authenticated SMB client that already holds an open handle with
FILE_WRITE_DATA on a file silently truncate that same file to size 0
via a single crafted SET_INFO(FILE_ALLOCATION_INFORMATION) request
advertising a near-U64_MAX AllocationSize, even though the request
asks to grow the file's allocation rather than shrink it. This is a
functional/data-loss bug, not a privilege-boundary
violation: the same client could already truncate the file via
FILE_END_OF_FILE_INFORMATION or a plain write.

Fix it by validating AllocationSize against MAX_LFS_FILESIZE, the
same upper bound the VFS itself uses to reject unrepresentable file
sizes, before doing the "+511" rounding, and rejecting oversized
values with -EINVAL. Bounding AllocationSize to
MAX_LFS_FILESIZE - 511 guarantees the "+511" addition cannot wrap,
and that the subsequent "alloc_blks * 512" values passed to
vfs_fallocate() and ksmbd_vfs_truncate() stay within a representable
loff_t as well.

No legitimate SMB client asks for an allocation size anywhere near
2^64 bytes, so this only rejects a value that was previously
silently misinterpreted as zero.

Runtime-verified on a v6.19 KASAN test stand: sending SET_INFO
(FILE_ALLOCATION_INFORMATION) with AllocationSize = 0xffffffffffffffff
against ksmbd now returns -EINVAL and leaves the target file's size
unchanged, where the unpatched kernel truncated it from 4096 to 0
bytes.

Fixes: e2f34481b2 ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c

@@ -6289,6 +6289,7 @@ static int set_file_allocation_info(struct ksmbd_work *work,
 	 */
 
 	loff_t alloc_blks;
+	u64 alloc_size;
 	struct inode *inode;
 	struct kstat stat;
 	int rc;
@@ -6301,7 +6302,19 @@ static int set_file_allocation_info(struct ksmbd_work *work,
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	alloc_blks = (le64_to_cpu(file_alloc_info->AllocationSize) + 511) >> 9;
+	/*
+	 * AllocationSize is fully client-controlled (the caller only
+	 * validates the fixed 8-byte buffer length). Reject values that
+	 * would overflow the "round up to 512-byte blocks" conversion
+	 * below instead of silently wrapping it to a tiny block count,
+	 * which would truncate the file to a size the client never
+	 * asked for.
+	 */
+	alloc_size = le64_to_cpu(file_alloc_info->AllocationSize);
+	if (alloc_size > MAX_LFS_FILESIZE - 511)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	alloc_blks = (alloc_size + 511) >> 9;
 	inode = file_inode(fp->filp);
 
 	if (alloc_blks > stat.blocks) {