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mac802154: llsec: add skb_cow_data() before in-place crypto
commit84a04eb5b2upstream. llsec_do_encrypt_unauth(), llsec_do_encrypt_auth(), llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(), and llsec_do_decrypt_auth() all perform in-place cryptographic transformations on skb data. They build a scatterlist with sg_init_one() pointing into the skb's linear data area and then pass the same scatterlist as both src and dst to the crypto API (e.g. crypto_skcipher_encrypt/decrypt, crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt). On the RX path, __ieee802154_rx_handle_packet() clones the received skb before handing it to each subscriber via ieee802154_subif_frame(). The cloned skb shares the same underlying data buffer via reference counting. When llsec_do_decrypt() subsequently modifies this shared buffer in place, it corrupts data that other clones -- potentially belonging to other sockets or subsystems -- still reference. On the TX path, similar data sharing can occur when an skb's head has been cloned (skb_cloned() returns true). The fix is to call skb_cow_data() before performing any in-place crypto operation. skb_cow_data() ensures that the skb's data area is not shared: if the skb head is cloned or the data spans multiple fragments, it copies the data into a private buffer that can be safely modified in place. This is the same pattern used by: - ESP (net/ipv4/esp4.c, net/ipv6/esp6.c) - MACsec (drivers/net/macsec.c) - WireGuard (drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c) - TIPC (net/tipc/crypto.c) Without this guard, in-place crypto on shared skb data leads to: - Silent data corruption of other skb clones - Use-after-free when the crypto API scatterwalk writes through a page that has already been freed by another clone's kfree_skb() - Kernel crashes under concurrent 802.15.4 traffic with security enabled (KASAN/KMSAN reports slab-use-after-free) Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis. Fixes:4c14a2fb5d("mac802154: add llsec decryption method") Fixes:03556e4d0d("mac802154: add llsec encryption method") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wpan/20260525161806.96158-1-doruk@0sec.ai/ Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai> Closes: <link to your mail on lore> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260526183726.56100-1-doruk@0sec.ai Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent
0cfa78c050
commit
bd968bdd56
@@ -710,6 +710,7 @@ int mac802154_llsec_encrypt(struct mac802154_llsec *sec, struct sk_buff *skb)
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{
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struct ieee802154_hdr hdr;
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int rc, authlen, hlen;
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struct sk_buff *trailer;
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struct mac802154_llsec_key *key;
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u32 frame_ctr;
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@@ -769,6 +770,12 @@ int mac802154_llsec_encrypt(struct mac802154_llsec *sec, struct sk_buff *skb)
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skb->mac_len = ieee802154_hdr_push(skb, &hdr);
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skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
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rc = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
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if (rc < 0) {
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llsec_key_put(key);
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return rc;
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}
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rc = llsec_do_encrypt(skb, sec, &hdr, key);
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llsec_key_put(key);
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@@ -908,6 +915,13 @@ llsec_do_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct mac802154_llsec *sec,
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const struct ieee802154_hdr *hdr,
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struct mac802154_llsec_key *key, __le64 dev_addr)
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{
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struct sk_buff *trailer;
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int err;
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err = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
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if (err < 0)
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return err;
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if (hdr->sec.level == IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_ENC)
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return llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(skb, sec, hdr, key, dev_addr);
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else
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