[ Upstream commit 094ee6017e ]
Following operations can trigger a warning[1]:
ip netns add ns1
ip netns exec ns1 ip link add bond0 type bond mode balance-rr
ip netns exec ns1 ip link set dev bond0 xdp obj af_xdp_kern.o sec xdp
ip netns exec ns1 ip link set bond0 type bond mode broadcast
ip netns del ns1
When delete the namespace, dev_xdp_uninstall() is called to remove xdp
program on bond dev, and bond_xdp_set() will check the bond mode. If bond
mode is changed after attaching xdp program, the warning may occur.
Some bond modes (broadcast, etc.) do not support native xdp. Set bond mode
with xdp program attached is not good. Add check for xdp program when set
bond mode.
[1]
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11 at net/core/dev.c:9912 unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x8d9/0x930
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc4 #107
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
RIP: 0010:unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x8d9/0x930
Code: 00 00 48 c7 c6 6f e3 a2 82 48 c7 c7 d0 b3 96 82 e8 9c 10 3e ...
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000063d80 EFLAGS: 00000282
RAX: 00000000ffffffa1 RBX: ffff888004959000 RCX: 00000000ffffdfff
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffffea RDI: ffffc90000063b48
RBP: ffffc90000063e28 R08: ffffffff82d39b28 R09: 0000000000009ffb
R10: 0000000000000175 R11: ffffffff82d09b40 R12: ffff8880049598e8
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: dead000000000100 R15: ffffc90000045000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888007a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000d406b60 CR3: 000000000483e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x83/0x130
? unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x8d9/0x930
? report_bug+0x18e/0x1a0
? handle_bug+0x54/0x90
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x8d9/0x930
? bond_net_exit_batch_rtnl+0x5c/0x90
cleanup_net+0x237/0x3d0
process_one_work+0x163/0x390
worker_thread+0x293/0x3b0
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xec/0x1e0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Fixes: 9e2ee5c7e7 ("net, bonding: Add XDP support to the bonding driver")
Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Jussi Maki <joamaki@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250321044852.1086551-1-wangliang74@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ Ignore changes in bond_xdp_set_features(), it was introduced to kernel
in commit:cb9e6e584d58 ("bonding: add xdp_features support") since 6.4 ]
Signed-off-by: Rajani Kantha <681739313@139.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 22ccb684c1 ]
Bonding only supports native XDP for specific modes, which can lead to
confusion for users regarding why XDP loads successfully at times and
fails at others. This patch enhances error handling by returning detailed
error messages, providing users with clearer insights into the specific
reasons for the failure when loading native XDP.
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241021031211.814-2-liuhangbin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rajani Kantha <681739313@139.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f613e8b4af ]
Yin Fengwei reported an RCU stall in ptype_seq_show() and provided
a patch.
Real issue is that ptype_seq_next() and ptype_seq_show() violate
RCU rules.
ptype_seq_show() runs under rcu_read_lock(), and reads pt->dev
to get device name without any barrier.
At the same time, concurrent writers can remove a packet_type structure
(which is correctly freed after an RCU grace period) and clear pt->dev
without an RCU grace period.
Define ptype_iter_state to carry a dev pointer along seq_net_private:
struct ptype_iter_state {
struct seq_net_private p;
struct net_device *dev; // added in this patch
};
We need to record the device pointer in ptype_get_idx() and
ptype_seq_next() so that ptype_seq_show() is safe against
concurrent pt->dev changes.
We also need to add full RCU protection in ptype_seq_next().
(Missing READ_ONCE() when reading list.next values)
Many thanks to Dong Chenchen for providing a repro.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Fixes: 1d10f8a1f4 ("net-procfs: show net devices bound packet types")
Fixes: c353e8983e ("net: introduce per netns packet chains")
Reported-by: Yin Fengwei <fengwei_yin@linux.alibaba.com>
Reported-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89iKRRKPnWjJmb-_3a=sq+9h6DvTQM4DBZHT5ZRGPMzQaiA@mail.gmail.com/T/#m7b80b9fc9b9267f90e0b7aad557595f686f9c50d
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Tested-by: Yin Fengwei <fengwei_yin@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260202205217.2881198-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ Some adjustments have been made. ]
Signed-off-by: XiaoHua Wang <561399680@139.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9f2c0ac142 ]
The previous commit 0718a78f6a ("ALSA: usb-audio: Kill timer properly at
removal") patched a UAF issue caused by the error timer.
However, because the error timer kill added in this patch occurs after the
endpoint delete, a race condition to UAF still occurs, albeit rarely.
Additionally, since kill-cleanup for urb is also missing, freed memory can
be accessed in interrupt context related to urb, which can cause UAF.
Therefore, to prevent this, error timer and urb must be killed before
freeing the heap memory.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+f02665daa2abeef4a947@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f02665daa2abeef4a947
Fixes: 0718a78f6a ("ALSA: usb-audio: Kill timer properly at removal")
Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <aha310510@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Wenshan Lan <jetlan9@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 8acffeef5e upstream.
Drop the WARN in sev_pin_memory() on npages overflowing an int, as the
WARN is comically trivially to trigger from userspace, e.g. by doing:
struct kvm_enc_region range = {
.addr = 0,
.size = -1ul,
};
__vm_ioctl(vm, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION, &range);
Note, the checks in sev_mem_enc_register_region() that presumably exist to
verify the incoming address+size are completely worthless, as both "addr"
and "size" are u64s and SEV is 64-bit only, i.e. they _can't_ be greater
than ULONG_MAX. That wart will be cleaned up in the near future.
if (range->addr > ULONG_MAX || range->size > ULONG_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
Opportunistically add a comment to explain why the code calculates the
number of pages the "hard" way, e.g. instead of just shifting @ulen.
Fixes: 78824fabc7 ("KVM: SVM: fix svn_pin_memory()'s use of get_user_pages_fast()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260313003302.3136111-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4a1c0ddc6e upstream.
[BUG]
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/resize.c:308!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_group_extend+0x10aa/0x1ae0 fs/ocfs2/resize.c:308
Code: 8b8520ff ffff83f8 860f8580 030000e8 5cc3c1fe
Call Trace:
...
ocfs2_ioctl+0x175/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:869
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x1e0 fs/ioctl.c:583
x64_sys_call+0x1144/0x26a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x93/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_group_extend() assumes that the global bitmap inode block
returned from ocfs2_inode_lock() has already been validated and
BUG_ONs when the signature is not a dinode. That assumption is too
strong for crafted filesystems because the JBD2-managed buffer path
can bypass structural validation and return an invalid dinode to the
resize ioctl.
[FIX]
Validate the dinode explicitly in ocfs2_group_extend(). If the global
bitmap buffer does not contain a valid dinode, report filesystem
corruption with ocfs2_error() and fail the resize operation instead of
crashing the kernel.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260401092303.3709187-1-gality369@gmail.com
Fixes: 10995aa245 ("ocfs2: Morph the haphazard OCFS2_IS_VALID_DINODE() checks.")
Signed-off-by: ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b02da26a99 upstream.
ocfs2_unlink takes orphan dir inode_lock first and then ip_alloc_sem,
while in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write, it acquires these locks in reverse order.
This creates an ABBA lock ordering violation on lock classes
ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE] and
ocfs2_file_ip_alloc_sem_key.
Lock Chain #0 (orphan dir inode_lock -> ip_alloc_sem):
ocfs2_unlink
ocfs2_prepare_orphan_dir
ocfs2_lookup_lock_orphan_dir
inode_lock(orphan_dir_inode) <- lock A
__ocfs2_prepare_orphan_dir
ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert
ocfs2_extend_dir
ocfs2_expand_inline_dir
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem) <- Lock B
Lock Chain #1 (ip_alloc_sem -> orphan dir inode_lock):
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem) <- Lock B
ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan()
inode_lock(orphan_dir_inode) <- Lock A
Deadlock Scenario:
CPU0 (unlink) CPU1 (dio_end_io_write)
------ ------
inode_lock(orphan_dir_inode)
down_write(ip_alloc_sem)
down_write(ip_alloc_sem)
inode_lock(orphan_dir_inode)
Since ip_alloc_sem is to protect allocation changes, which is unrelated
with operations in ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan. So move
ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan out of ip_alloc_sem to fix the deadlock.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260306032211.1016452-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
Reported-by: syzbot+67b90111784a3eac8c04@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=67b90111784a3eac8c04
Fixes: a86a72a4a4 ("ocfs2: take ip_alloc_sem in ocfs2_dio_get_block & ocfs2_dio_end_io_write")
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f8e1fc918a upstream.
syzbot reported a general protection fault in vidtv_psi_desc_assign [1].
vidtv_psi_pmt_stream_init() can return NULL on memory allocation
failure, but vidtv_channel_pmt_match_sections() does not check for
this. When tail is NULL, the subsequent call to
vidtv_psi_desc_assign(&tail->descriptor, desc) dereferences a NULL
pointer offset, causing a general protection fault.
Add a NULL check after vidtv_psi_pmt_stream_init(). On failure, clean
up the already-allocated stream chain and return.
[1]
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:vidtv_psi_desc_assign+0x24/0x90 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_psi.c:629
Call Trace:
<TASK>
vidtv_channel_pmt_match_sections drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_channel.c:349 [inline]
vidtv_channel_si_init+0x1445/0x1a50 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_channel.c:479
vidtv_mux_init+0x526/0xbe0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c:519
vidtv_start_streaming drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_bridge.c:194 [inline]
vidtv_start_feed+0x33e/0x4d0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_bridge.c:239
Fixes: f90cf6079b ("media: vidtv: add a bridge driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+1f5bcc7c919ec578777a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=1f5bcc7c919ec578777a
Signed-off-by: Ruslan Valiyev <linuxoid@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil+cisco@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f08fe8891c upstream.
There is an OOB read problem on dentry_hashtable when user sets
'dhash_entries=1':
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888b30b774b0
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
RIP: 0010:__d_lookup+0x56/0x120
Call Trace:
d_lookup.cold+0x16/0x5d
lookup_dcache+0x27/0xf0
lookup_one_qstr_excl+0x2a/0x180
start_dirop+0x55/0xa0
simple_start_creating+0x8d/0xa0
debugfs_start_creating+0x8c/0x180
debugfs_create_dir+0x1d/0x1c0
pinctrl_init+0x6d/0x140
do_one_initcall+0x6d/0x3d0
kernel_init_freeable+0x39f/0x460
kernel_init+0x2a/0x260
There will be only one bucket in dentry_hashtable when dhash_entries is
set as one, and d_hash_shift is calculated as 32 by dcache_init(). Then,
following process will access more than one buckets(which memory region
is not allocated) in dentry_hashtable:
d_lookup
b = d_hash(hash)
dentry_hashtable + ((u32)hashlen >> d_hash_shift)
// The C standard defines the behavior of right shift amounts
// exceeding the bit width of the operand as undefined. The
// result of '(u32)hashlen >> d_hash_shift' becomes 'hashlen',
// so 'b' will point to an unallocated memory region.
hlist_bl_for_each_entry_rcu(b)
hlist_bl_first_rcu(head)
h->first // read OOB!
Fix it by limiting the minimal number of dentry_hashtable bucket to two,
so that 'd_hash_shift' won't exceeds the bit width of type u32.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260130034853.215819-1-chengzhihao1@huawei.com
Reviewed-by: Yang Erkun <yangerkun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e9418da50d upstream.
Commit 391e69143d increased CT_PTP_NUM from 1 to 4 to support 256
playback streams, but the additional pages are not used by the card
correctly. The CT20K2 hardware already has multiple VMEM_PTPAL
registers, but using them separately would require refactoring the
entire virtual memory allocation logic.
ct_vm_map() always uses PTEs in vm->ptp[0].area regardless of
CT_PTP_NUM. On AMD64 systems, a single PTP covers 512 PTEs (2M). When
aggregate memory allocations exceed this limit, ct_vm_map() tries to
access beyond the allocated space and causes a page fault:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffd4ae8a10a000
Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI
RIP: 0010:ct_vm_map+0x17c/0x280 [snd_ctxfi]
Call Trace:
atc_pcm_playback_prepare+0x225/0x3b0
ct_pcm_playback_prepare+0x38/0x60
snd_pcm_do_prepare+0x2f/0x50
snd_pcm_action_single+0x36/0x90
snd_pcm_action_nonatomic+0xbf/0xd0
snd_pcm_ioctl+0x28/0x40
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x81/0x610
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Revert CT_PTP_NUM to 1. The 256 SRC_RESOURCE_NUM and playback_count
remain unchanged.
Fixes: 391e69143d ("ALSA: ctxfi: Bump playback substreams to 256")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Harin Lee <me@harin.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260406074857.216034-1-me@harin.net
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0beba407d4 upstream.
Patch series "Docs/admin-guide/mm/damon: warn commit_inputs vs other
params race".
Writing 'Y' to the commit_inputs parameter of DAMON_RECLAIM and
DAMON_LRU_SORT, and writing other parameters before the commit_inputs
request is completely processed can cause race conditions. While the
consequence can be bad, the documentation is not clearly describing that.
Add clear warnings.
The issue was discovered [1,2] by sashiko.
This patch (of 2):
DAMON_RECLAIM handles commit_inputs request inside kdamond thread,
reading the module parameters. If the user updates the module
parameters while the kdamond thread is reading those, races can happen.
To avoid this, the commit_inputs parameter shows whether it is still in
the progress, assuming users wouldn't update parameters in the middle of
the work. Some users might ignore that. Add a warning about the
behavior.
The issue was discovered in [1] by sashiko.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260329153052.46657-2-sj@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260319161620.189392-3-objecting@objecting.org [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260319161620.189392-2-objecting@objecting.org [3]
Fixes: 81a84182c3 ("Docs/admin-guide/mm/damon/reclaim: document 'commit_inputs' parameter")
Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.19.x
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a31e4518be upstream.
Much like commit 19f953e743 ("fbdev: fb_pm2fb: Avoid potential divide
by zero error"), we also need to prevent that same crash from happening
in the udlfb driver as it uses pixclock directly when dividing, which
will crash.
Cc: Bernie Thompson <bernie@plugable.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Fixes: 59277b679f ("Staging: udlfb: add dynamic modeset support")
Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b84cc80610 upstream.
When a port is disabled, an attached device will be disconnected. This
causes a port-status-change event, which will race with hub autosuspend
(if the disabled port was the only connected port on its hub), causing
an immediate resume and a second autosuspend. Both of these can be
avoided by adding a short delay after the call to
usb_hub_set_port_power().
Below log shows what is happening:
$ echo 1 > usb1-port1/disable
[ 37.958239] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 2
[ 37.964101] usb 1-1: unregistering device
[ 37.970070] hub 1-0:1.0: hub_suspend
[ 37.971305] hub 1-0:1.0: state 7 ports 1 chg 0000 evt 0002
[ 37.974412] usb usb1: bus auto-suspend, wakeup 1
[ 37.988175] usb usb1: suspend raced with wakeup event <---
[ 37.993947] usb usb1: usb auto-resume
[ 37.998401] hub 1-0:1.0: hub_resume
[ 38.105688] usb usb1-port1: status 0000, change 0000, 12 Mb/s
[ 38.112399] hub 1-0:1.0: state 7 ports 1 chg 0000 evt 0000
[ 38.118645] hub 1-0:1.0: hub_suspend
[ 38.122963] usb usb1: bus auto-suspend, wakeup 1
[ 38.200368] usb usb1: usb wakeup-resume
[ 38.204982] usb usb1: usb auto-resume
[ 38.209376] hub 1-0:1.0: hub_resume
[ 38.213676] usb usb1-port1: status 0101 change 0001
[ 38.321552] hub 1-0:1.0: state 7 ports 1 chg 0002 evt 0000
[ 38.327978] usb usb1-port1: status 0101, change 0000, 12 Mb/s
[ 38.457429] usb 1-1: new high-speed USB device number 3 using ci_hdrc
Then, port change bit will be fixed to the final state and
usb_clear_port_feature() can correctly clear it after this period. This
will also avoid usb runtime suspend routine to run because
usb_autopm_put_interface() not run yet.
Fixes: f061f43d74 ("usb: hub: port: add sysfs entry to switch port power")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Xu Yang <xu.yang_2@nxp.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260316095042.1559882-1-xu.yang_2@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f58752ebcb upstream.
The Lenovo Yoga Book 9 14IAH10 (83KJ) has a composite USB device
(17EF:6161) that controls both touchscreens via a CDC ACM interface.
Interface 0 is a standard CDC ACM control interface, but interface 1
(the data interface) incorrectly declares vendor-specific class (0xFF)
instead of USB_CLASS_CDC_DATA. cdc-acm rejects the device at probe with
-EINVAL, leaving interface 0 unbound and EP 0x82 never polled.
With no consumer polling EP 0x82, the firmware's watchdog fires every
~20 seconds and resets the USB bus, producing a continuous disconnect/
reconnect loop that prevents the touchscreens from ever initialising.
Add two new quirk flags:
VENDOR_CLASS_DATA_IFACE: Bypasses the bInterfaceClass check in
acm_probe() that would otherwise reject the vendor-class data
interface with -EINVAL.
ALWAYS_POLL_CTRL: Submits the notification URB at probe() rather than
waiting for a TTY open. This keeps EP 0x82 polled at all times,
permanently suppressing the firmware watchdog. The URB is resubmitted
after port_shutdown() and on system resume. SET_CONTROL_LINE_STATE
(DTR|RTS) is sent at probe and after port_shutdown() to complete
firmware handshake.
Note: the firmware performs exactly 4 USB connect/disconnect cycles
(~19 s each) on every cold boot before stabilising. This is a fixed
firmware property; touch is available ~75-80 s after power-on.
Signed-off-by: Dave Carey <carvsdriver@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Dave Carey <carvsdriver@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260402182950.389016-1-carvsdriver@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2ab833a16a upstream.
When a USB/IP client receives a RET_SUBMIT response,
usbip_pack_ret_submit() unconditionally overwrites
urb->number_of_packets from the network PDU. This value is
subsequently used as the loop bound in usbip_recv_iso() and
usbip_pad_iso() to iterate over urb->iso_frame_desc[], a flexible
array whose size was fixed at URB allocation time based on the
*original* number_of_packets from the CMD_SUBMIT.
A malicious USB/IP server can set number_of_packets in the response
to a value larger than what was originally submitted, causing a heap
out-of-bounds write when usbip_recv_iso() writes to
urb->iso_frame_desc[i] beyond the allocated region.
KASAN confirmed this with kernel 7.0.0-rc5:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbip_recv_iso+0x46a/0x640
Write of size 4 at addr ffff888106351d40 by task vhci_rx/69
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 320-byte region [ffff888106351c00, ffff888106351d40)
The server side (stub_rx.c) and gadget side (vudc_rx.c) already
validate number_of_packets in the CMD_SUBMIT path since commits
c6688ef9f2 ("usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle
malicious input") and b78d830f00 ("usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden
CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input"). The server side validates
against USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS because no URB exists yet at that point.
On the client side we have the original URB, so we can use the tighter
bound: the response must not exceed the original number_of_packets.
This mirrors the existing validation of actual_length against
transfer_buffer_length in usbip_recv_xbuff(), which checks the
response value against the original allocation size.
Kelvin Mbogo's series ("usb: usbip: fix integer overflow in
usbip_recv_iso()", v2) hardens the receive-side functions themselves;
this patch complements that work by catching the bad value at its
source -- in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the overwrite -- and
using the tighter per-URB allocation bound rather than the global
USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS limit.
Fix this by checking rpdu->number_of_packets against
urb->number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit() before the
overwrite. On violation, clamp to zero so that usbip_recv_iso() and
usbip_pad_iso() safely return early.
Fixes: 1325f85fa4 ("staging: usbip: bugfix add number of packets for isochronous frames")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Rebello <nathan.c.rebello@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260402085259.234-1-nathan.c.rebello@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 53370cf909 upstream.
parse_dacl() compares each ACE SID against sid_unix_NFS_mode and on
match reads sid.sub_auth[2] as the file mode. If sid_unix_NFS_mode is
the prefix S-1-5-88-3 with num_subauth = 2 then compare_sids() compares
only min(num_subauth, 2) sub-authorities so a client SID with
num_subauth = 2 and sub_auth = {88, 3} will match.
If num_subauth = 2 and the ACE is placed at the very end of the security
descriptor, sub_auth[2] will be 4 bytes past end_of_acl. The
out-of-band bytes will then be masked to the low 9 bits and applied as
the file's POSIX mode, probably not something that is good to have
happen.
Fix this up by forcing the SID to actually carry a third sub-authority
before reading it at all.
Cc: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6675184121 upstream.
smb2_get_ea() reads ea_req->EaNameLength from the client request and
passes it directly to strncmp() as the comparison length without
verifying that the length of the name really is the size of the input
buffer received.
Fix this up by properly checking the size of the name based on the value
received and the overall size of the request, to prevent a later
strncmp() call to use the length as a "trusted" size of the buffer.
Without this check, uninitialized heap values might be slowly leaked to
the client.
Cc: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f880aac8a5 upstream.
The GET_STATUS and SET/CLEAR_FEATURE handlers extract the endpoint
number from the host-supplied wIndex without any sort of validation.
Fix this up by validating the number of endpoints actually match up with
the number the device has before attempting to dereference a pointer
based on this math.
This is just like what was done in commit ee0d382feb ("usb: gadget:
aspeed_udc: validate endpoint index for ast udc") for the aspeed driver.
Fixes: 746bfe63bb ("usb: gadget: renesas_usb3: add support for Renesas USB3.0 peripheral controller")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2026040647-sincerity-untidy-b104@gregkh
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c088d5dd2f upstream.
A broken/bored/mean USB host can overflow the skb_shared_info->frags[]
array on a Linux gadget exposing a Phonet function by sending an
unbounded sequence of full-page OUT transfers.
pn_rx_complete() finalizes the skb only when req->actual < req->length,
where req->length is set to PAGE_SIZE by the gadget. If the host always
sends exactly PAGE_SIZE bytes per transfer, fp->rx.skb will never be
reset and each completion will add another fragment via
skb_add_rx_frag(). Once nr_frags exceeds MAX_SKB_FRAGS (default 17),
subsequent frag stores overwrite memory adjacent to the shinfo on the
heap.
Drop the skb and account a length error when the frag limit is reached,
matching the fix applied in t7xx by commit f0813bcd2d ("net: wwan:
t7xx: fix potential skb->frags overflow in RX path").
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2026040705-fruit-unloved-0701@gregkh
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8f993d30b9 upstream.
The block_len read from the host-supplied NTB header is checked against
ntb_max but has no lower bound. When block_len is smaller than
opts->ndp_size, the bounds check of:
ndp_index > (block_len - opts->ndp_size)
will underflow producing a huge unsigned value that ndp_index can never
exceed, defeating the check entirely.
The same underflow occurs in the datagram index checks against block_len
- opts->dpe_size. With those checks neutered, a malicious USB host can
choose ndp_index and datagram offsets that point past the actual
transfer, and the skb_put_data() copies adjacent kernel memory into the
network skb.
Fix this by rejecting block lengths that cannot hold at least the NTB
header plus one NDP. This will make block_len - opts->ndp_size and
block_len - opts->dpe_size both well-defined.
Commit 8d2b1a1ec9 ("CDC-NCM: avoid overflow in sanity checking") fixed
a related class of issues on the host side of NCM.
Fixes: 2b74b0a04d ("USB: gadget: f_ncm: add bounds checks to ncm_unwrap_ntb()")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2026040753-baffle-handheld-624d@gregkh
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8f98b81fe0 upstream.
Much like commit 19f953e743 ("fbdev: fb_pm2fb: Avoid potential divide
by zero error"), we also need to prevent that same crash from happening
in the udlfb driver as it uses pixclock directly when dividing, which
will crash.
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 07704bbf36 upstream.
The status field in an EFW response is a 32-bit value supplied by the
firewire device. efr_status_names[] has 17 entries so a status value
outside that range goes off into the weeds when looking at the %s value.
Even worse, the status could return EFR_STATUS_INCOMPLETE which is
0x80000000, and is obviously not in that array of potential strings.
Fix this up by properly bounding the index against the array size and
printing "unknown" if it's not recognized.
Cc: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.com>
Fixes: bde8a8f23b ("ALSA: fireworks: Add transaction and some commands")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2026040953-astute-camera-1aa1@gregkh
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 46ce8be2ce upstream.
The NFC-A anti-collision cascade in digital_in_recv_sdd_res() appends 3
or 4 bytes to target->nfcid1 on each round, but the number of cascade
rounds is controlled entirely by the peer device. The peer sets the
cascade tag in the SDD_RES (deciding 3 vs 4 bytes) and the
cascade-incomplete bit in the SEL_RES (deciding whether another round
follows).
ISO 14443-3 limits NFC-A to three cascade levels and target->nfcid1 is
sized accordingly (NFC_NFCID1_MAXSIZE = 10), but nothing in the driver
actually enforces this. This means a malicious peer can keep the
cascade running, writing past the heap-allocated nfc_target with each
round.
Fix this by rejecting the response when the accumulated UID would exceed
the buffer.
Commit e329e71013 ("NFC: nci: Bounds check struct nfc_target arrays")
fixed similar missing checks against the same field on the NCI path.
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Thierry Escande <thierry.escande@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Fixes: 2c66daecc4 ("NFC Digital: Add NFC-A technology support")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2026040913-figure-seducing-bd3f@gregkh
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 69c02ffde6 upstream.
s32ton() shifts by n-1 where n is the field's report_size, a value that
comes directly from a HID device. The HID parser bounds report_size
only to <= 256, so a broken HID device can supply a report descriptor
with a wide field that triggers shift exponents up to 256 on a 32-bit
type when an output report is built via hid_output_field() or
hid_set_field().
Commit ec61b41918 ("HID: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in
hid_report_raw_event") added the same n > 32 clamp to the function
snto32(), but s32ton() was never given the same fix as I guess syzbot
hadn't figured out how to fuzz a device the same way.
Fix this up by just clamping the max value of n, just like snto32()
does.
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-input@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1badfc4319 upstream.
Commit ecfa6f3449 ("HID: Add HID_CLAIMED_INPUT guards in raw_event
callbacks missing them") attempted to fix up the HID drivers that had
missed the previous fix that was done in 2ff5baa9b5 ("HID: appleir:
Fix potential NULL dereference at raw event handle"), but the alps
driver was missed.
Fix this up by properly checking in the hid-alps driver that it had been
claimed correctly before attempting to process the raw event.
Fixes: 73196ebe13 ("HID: alps: add support for Alps T4 Touchpad device")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss@kernel.org>
Cc: Masaki Ota <masaki.ota@jp.alps.com>
Cc: linux-input@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a535a9217c upstream.
raw_release() unregisters raw CAN receive filters via can_rx_unregister(),
but receiver deletion is deferred with call_rcu(). This leaves a window
where raw_rcv() may still be running in an RCU read-side critical section
after raw_release() frees ro->uniq, leading to a use-after-free of the
percpu uniq storage.
Move free_percpu(ro->uniq) out of raw_release() and into a raw-specific
socket destructor. can_rx_unregister() takes an extra reference to the
socket and only drops it from the RCU callback, so freeing uniq from
sk_destruct ensures the percpu area is not released until the relevant
callbacks have drained.
Fixes: 514ac99c64 ("can: fix multiple delivery of a single CAN frame for overlapping CAN filters")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.1+
Assisted-by: Bynario AI
Signed-off-by: Samuel Page <sam@bynar.io>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/26ec626d-cae7-4418-9782-7198864d070c@bynar.io
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
[mkl: applied manually]
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2b5dd46329 upstream.
In nfc_llcp_recv_hdlc() and nfc_llcp_recv_disc(), when the socket
state is LLCP_CLOSED, the code correctly calls release_sock() and
nfc_llcp_sock_put() but fails to return. Execution falls through to
the remainder of the function, which calls release_sock() and
nfc_llcp_sock_put() again. This results in a double release_sock()
and a refcount underflow via double nfc_llcp_sock_put(), leading to
a use-after-free.
Add the missing return statements after the LLCP_CLOSED branches
in both functions to prevent the fall-through.
Fixes: d646960f79 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: Junxi Qian <qjx1298677004@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408081006.3723-1-qjx1298677004@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 75519f5df2 ]
This far using crtc_state->pipe_src as borders for Selective Update area
haven't caused visible problems as drm_rect_width(crtc_state->pipe_src) ==
crtc_state->hw.adjusted_mode.crtc_hdisplay and
drm_rect_height(crtc_state->pipe_src) ==
crtc_state->hw.adjusted_mode.crtc_vdisplay when pipe scaling is not
used. On the other hand using pipe scaling is forcing full frame updates and all the
Selective Update area calculations are skipped. Now this improper usage of
crtc_state->pipe_src is causing following warnings:
<4> [7771.978166] xe 0000:00:02.0: [drm] drm_WARN_ON_ONCE(su_lines % vdsc_cfg->slice_height)
after WARN_ON_ONCE was added by commit:
"drm/i915/dsc: Add helper for writing DSC Selective Update ET parameters"
These warnings are seen when DSC and pipe scaling are enabled
simultaneously. This is because on full frame update SU area is improperly
set as pipe_src which is not aligned with DSC slice height.
Fix these by creating local rectangle using
crtc_state->hw.adjusted_mode.crtc_hdisplay and
crtc_state->hw.adjusted_mode.crtc_vdisplay. Use this local rectangle as
borders for SU area.
Fixes: d6774b8c3c ("drm/i915: Ensure damage clip area is within pipe area")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.0+
Signed-off-by: Jouni Högander <jouni.hogander@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mika Kahola <mika.kahola@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260327114553.195285-1-jouni.hogander@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit da0cdc1c32)
Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
[ omitted hunks for DSC selective update ET alignment infrastructure ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f900e1d77e ]
Hyunwoo Kim reports out-of-bounds access in sctp and ctnetlink.
These attributes are used by the kernel without any validation.
Extend the netlink policies accordingly.
Quoting the reporter:
nlattr_to_sctp() assigns the user-supplied CTA_PROTOINFO_SCTP_STATE
value directly to ct->proto.sctp.state without checking that it is
within the valid range. [..]
and: ... with exp->dir = 100, the access at
ct->master->tuplehash[100] reads 5600 bytes past the start of a
320-byte nf_conn object, causing a slab-out-of-bounds read confirmed by
UBSAN.
Fixes: 076a0ca026 ("netfilter: ctnetlink: add NAT support for expectations")
Fixes: a258860e01 ("netfilter: ctnetlink: add full support for SCTP to ctnetlink")
Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 45ebe43ea0 upstream.
This reverts commit 6bee098b91.
Den 2026-03-25 kl. 22:11, skrev Simona Vetter:
> On Wed, Mar 25, 2026 at 10:26:40AM -0700, Guenter Roeck wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 13, 2026 at 04:17:27PM +0100, Maarten Lankhorst wrote:
>>> When trying to do a rather aggressive test of igt's "xe_module_load
>>> --r reload" with a full desktop environment and game running I noticed
>>> a few OOPSes when dereferencing freed pointers, related to
>>> framebuffers and property blobs after the compositor exits.
>>>
>>> Solve this by guarding the freeing in drm_file with drm_dev_enter/exit,
>>> and immediately put the references from struct drm_file objects during
>>> drm_dev_unplug().
>>>
>>
>> With this patch in v6.18.20, I get the warning backtraces below.
>> The backtraces are gone with the patch reverted.
>
> Yeah, this needs to be reverted, reasoning below. Maarten, can you please
> take care of that and feed the revert through the usual channels? I don't
> think it's critical enough that we need to fast-track this into drm.git
> directly.
>
> Quoting the patch here again:
>
>> drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c| 5 ++++-
>> drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c | 9 ++++++---
>> 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c
>> index ec820686b3021..f52141f842a1f 100644
>> --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c
>> +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_file.c
>> @@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ static void drm_events_release(struct drm_file *file_priv)
>> void drm_file_free(struct drm_file *file)
>> {
>> struct drm_device *dev;
>> +int idx;
>>
>> if (!file)
>> return;
>> @@ -249,9 +250,11 @@ void drm_file_free(struct drm_file *file)
>>
>> drm_events_release(file);
>>
>> -if (drm_core_check_feature(dev, DRIVER_MODESET)) {
>> +if (drm_core_check_feature(dev, DRIVER_MODESET) &&
>> +drm_dev_enter(dev, &idx)) {
>
> This is misplaced for two reasons:
>
> - Even if we'd want to guarantee that we hold a drm_dev_enter/exit
> reference during framebuffer teardown, we'd need to do this
> _consistently over all callsites. Not ad-hoc in just one place that a
> testcase hits. This also means kerneldoc updates of the relevant hooks
> and at least a bunch of acks from other driver people to document the
> consensus.
>
> - More importantly, this is driver responsibilities in general unless we
> have extremely good reasons to the contrary. Which means this must be
> placed in xe.
>
>> drm_fb_release(file);
>> drm_property_destroy_user_blobs(dev, file);
>> +drm_dev_exit(idx);
>> }
>>
>> if (drm_core_check_feature(dev, DRIVER_SYNCOBJ))
>> diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c
>> index 84ae8a23a3678..e349418978f79 100644
>> --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c
>> +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_config.c
>> @@ -583,10 +583,13 @@ void drm_mode_config_cleanup(struct drm_device *dev)
>> */
>> WARN_ON(!list_empty(&dev->mode_config.fb_list));
>> list_for_each_entry_safe(fb, fbt, &dev->mode_config.fb_list, head) {
>> -struct drm_printer p = drm_dbg_printer(dev, DRM_UT_KMS, "[leaked fb]");
>> +if (list_empty(&fb->filp_head) || drm_framebuffer_read_refcount(fb) > 1) {
>> +struct drm_printer p = drm_dbg_printer(dev, DRM_UT_KMS, "[leaked fb]");
>
> This is also wrong:
>
> - Firstly, it's a completely independent bug, we do not smash two bugfixes
> into one patch.
>
> - Secondly, it's again a driver bug: drm_mode_cleanup must be called when
> the last drm_device reference disappears (hence the existence of
> drmm_mode_config_init), not when the driver gets unbound. The fact that
> this shows up in a callchain from a devres cleanup means the intel
> driver gets this wrong (like almost everyone else because historically
> we didn't know better).
>
> If we don't follow this rule, then we get races with this code here
> running concurrently with drm_file fb cleanups, which just does not
> work. Review pointed that out, but then shrugged it off with a confused
> explanation:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/e61e64c796ccfb17ae673331a3df4b877bf42d82.camel@linux.intel.com/
>
> Yes this also means a lot of the other drm_device teardown that drivers
> do happens way too early. There is a massive can of worms here of a
> magnitude that most likely is much, much bigger than what you can
> backport to stable kernels. Hotunplug is _hard_.
Back to the drawing board, and fixing it in the intel display driver
instead.
Cc: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Fixes: 6bee098b91 ("drm: Fix use-after-free on framebuffers and property blobs when calling drm_dev_unplug")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Simona Vetter <simona.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <dev@lankhorst.se>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260326082217.39941-2-dev@lankhorst.se
[ Thorsten: adjust to the v6.6.y/v6.6.y backports of 6bee098b91 ]
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Leemhuis <linux@leemhuis.info>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7b568e9eba ]
This warning can be triggered if NUMA is disabled and the system
boots with fewer CPUs than the number of CPUs in die 0.
WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 7257 at uncore.c:1157 uncore_pci_pmu_register+0x136/0x160 [intel_uncore]
Currently, the discovery table continues to be parsed even if all CPUs
in the associated die are offline. This can lead to an array overflow
at "pmu->boxes[die] = box" in uncore_pci_pmu_register(), which may
trigger the warning above or cause other issues.
Fixes: edae1f06c2 ("perf/x86/intel/uncore: Parse uncore discovery tables")
Reported-by: Steve Wahl <steve.wahl@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Zide Chen <zide.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Steve Wahl <steve.wahl@hpe.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260313174050.171704-3-zide.chen@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fdce0b3590 ]
`eui64_mt6()` derives a modified EUI-64 from the Ethernet source address
and compares it with the low 64 bits of the IPv6 source address.
The existing guard only rejects an invalid MAC header when
`par->fragoff != 0`. For packets with `par->fragoff == 0`, `eui64_mt6()`
can still reach `eth_hdr(skb)` even when the MAC header is not valid.
Fix this by removing the `par->fragoff != 0` condition so that packets
with an invalid MAC header are rejected before accessing `eth_hdr(skb)`.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Tested-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ff64c5bfef ]
ports_match_v1() treats any non-zero pflags entry as the start of a
port range and unconditionally consumes the next ports[] element as
the range end.
The checkentry path currently validates protocol, flags and count, but
it does not validate the range encoding itself. As a result, malformed
rules can mark the last slot as a range start or place two range starts
back to back, leaving ports_match_v1() to step past the last valid
ports[] element while interpreting the rule.
Reject malformed multiport v1 rules in checkentry by validating that
each range start has a following element and that the following element
is not itself marked as another range start.
Fixes: a89ecb6a2e ("[NETFILTER]: x_tables: unify IPv4/IPv6 multiport match")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Tested-by: Yuhang Zheng <z1652074432@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1f3083aec8 ]
When batching multiple NFLOG messages (inst->qlen > 1), __nfulnl_send()
appends an NLMSG_DONE terminator with sizeof(struct nfgenmsg) payload via
nlmsg_put(), but never initializes the nfgenmsg bytes. The nlmsg_put()
helper only zeroes alignment padding after the payload, not the payload
itself, so four bytes of stale kernel heap data are leaked to userspace
in the NLMSG_DONE message body.
Use nfnl_msg_put() to build the NLMSG_DONE terminator, which initializes
the nfgenmsg payload via nfnl_fill_hdr(), consistent with how
__build_packet_message() already constructs NFULNL_MSG_PACKET headers.
Fixes: 29c5d4afba ("[NETFILTER]: nfnetlink_log: fix sending of multipart messages")
Reported-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit efaa71faf2 ]
The querier-interval test adds h1 (currently a slave of the VRF created
by simple_if_init) to a temporary bridge br1 acting as an outside IGMP
querier. The kernel VRF driver (drivers/net/vrf.c) calls cycle_netdev()
on every slave add and remove, toggling the interface admin-down then up.
Phylink takes the PHY down during the admin-down half of that cycle.
Since h1 and swp1 are cable-connected, swp1 also loses its link may need
several seconds to re-negotiate.
Use setup_wait_dev $h1 0 which waits for h1 to return to UP state, so the
test can rely on the link being back up at this point.
Fixes: 4d8610ee8b ("selftests: net: bridge: add vlan mcast_querier_interval tests")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/c830f130860fd2efae08bfb9e5b25fd028e58ce5.1775424423.git.daniel@makrotopia.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
