commit 76a2db58e9 upstream.
dcn32_update_clocks_update_dtb_dto() and its dcn35 counterpart reprogram
the DTB DTO of every timing generator in the context whenever the DTBCLK
reference changes, passing a zeroed pixel rate and never setting
is_hdmi. Both dccg set_dtbclk_dto() implementations treat a zero pixel
rate as a disable request. On dcn32 that branch drives PIPE_DTO_SRC_SEL
to the DP DTO source, so a timing generator actively scanning out an
HDMI stream has its pixel rate source re-muxed out from under the live
raster and the OTG stops on the spot. On dcn35 it clears
DTBCLK_DTO_ENABLE and restores DTBCLK_Pn clock gating, which does the
same to a live 128b/132b stream.
Two displays where only one runs a 128b/132b link hit this reliably.
is_dtbclk_required() holds the DTBCLK reference high while both are
active, and the moment the 128b/132b stream is torn down (compositor
switch, display disable, hot-unplug) the next safe_to_lower pass drops
the reference to the lowest DPM level and the DTO walk freezes the
surviving screen. On Navi31 the DAL mailbox then goes deaf on the
DISPCLK hard-min that follows the walk in dcn32_update_clocks(),
stranding both SMU mailboxes until reboot.
Set is_hdmi for HDMI and DVI signals so the disable path leaves the
pixel rate source selection on the HDMI path, and pass the real pixel
rate for 128b/132b streams so a reference change rescales their DTO
instead of disabling it.
Fixes: 128c1ca030 ("drm/amd/display: Update DTBCLK for DCN32")
Fixes: 8774029f76 ("drm/amd/display: Add DCN35 CLK_MGR")
Signed-off-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Fangzhi Zuo <Jerry.Zuo@amd.com>
Tested-by: Dan Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
[ mschwartz: dcn32 and dcn35 clk_mgr hunks only. The rest is HDMI FRL
enablement, absent before 7.2, so the FRL conditions and the
req_audio_dtbclk_khz assignment they guard are dropped and the
FRL-centric changelog is rewritten. Added the pipe_ctx->stream check
the new dereferences need. ]
Signed-off-by: Matthew Schwartz <matthew.schwartz@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 6fe4e4b825 upstream.
When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls
fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem's list of block devices,
then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(),
blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one.
Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically
allocated array. This dynamic allocation is problematic because:
- It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call
site when it's invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim.
- fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn't handle the failure. It
just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling
blk_crypto_evict_key(). That causes a use-after-free.
For now, let's fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable
way by switching to an on-stack array. Currently the fscrypt
multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded
limit of 8 block devices. An on-stack array works fine for that.
(Of course, this solution won't scale up to large number of block
devices. For that we'd need a different solution, like moving the block
device iteration into the filesystem. Or in the case of btrfs, which
will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call
blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won't be needed.)
Fixes: 22e9947a4b ("fscrypt: stop holding extra request_queue references")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260713023708.9245-1-ebiggers%40kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260719055602.78828-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 5152c6d49e upstream.
set_ntacl_dacl() validates sid.num_subauth before copying an ACE, but
does not verify that the declared ACE size contains all sub-authorities
described by that field. An undersized ACE can therefore be copied
and later make the POSIX ACL deduplication walk inspect data beyond
the copied ACE boundary.
The existing initial bound check is also too small. It only ensures
that the ACE size field is accessible before set_ntacl_dacl() reads
sid.num_subauth farther into the input buffer.
Require enough input for the fixed SID header before accessing
num_subauth, reject ACEs smaller than that header, and skip ACEs
whose declared size cannot contain the complete SID. This makes the
validation consistent with the other ACE walk paths.
Reported-by: LocalHost <localhost.detect@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 58d97fcd0b upstream.
set_ntacl_dacl() can stop copying ACEs before consuming the full input
DACL when size accounting overflows.
When that happens, num_aces reflects only the ACEs that were actually
copied into the output DACL, but set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() still
receives nt_num_aces and uses it to walk the existing ACE array during
dedup.
That makes the dedup walk scan past the copied ACE array and inspect
buffer tail that does not contain valid ACEs.
Split the two meanings currently carried by the NT ACE count. Pass the
number of copied NT ACEs to bound the dedup walk, and preserve the
original "input DACL had NT ACEs" state separately for the
Everyone/default ACL fallback.
This keeps the dedup walk aligned with the ACEs that are actually
present in the rebuilt DACL.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit bbf0a8e931 upstream.
check_add_overflow() unconditionally writes the truncated sum into *d
even on overflow, per its contract in include/linux/overflow.h.
The four check_add_overflow() guards in set_posix_acl_entries_dacl()
and set_ntacl_dacl() break out of the ACE-building loops on overflow,
but the truncated *size is then consumed downstream at the end of
set_ntacl_dacl():
pndacl->size = cpu_to_le16(le16_to_cpu(pndacl->size) + size);
This produces an on-wire NT ACL whose pndacl->size under-reports the
bytes actually written by the preceding fill_ace_for_sid()/memcpy()
calls, yielding a malformed ACL that can trigger out-of-bounds reads
when re-parsed by clients or ksmbd itself.
Restore *size to its pre-addition value on each overflow branch (via
`*size -= ace_sz` / `size -= nt_ace_size`) so that after the break,
*size once again holds the cumulative size of the successfully-written
ACEs. The committed ACL is then truncated-but-self-consistent rather
than malformed.
The ksmbd DACL builders are the only check_add_overflow() sites found
where an overflow path breaks out of a loop and the destination value
is consumed afterward. The other nearby break-style cases either
return -EINVAL on overflow (transport_ipc.c) or break without
consuming the overflowed destination value afterward (buildid.c).
Fixes: 299f962c0b ("ksmbd: use check_add_overflow() to prevent u16 DACL size overflow")
Assisted-by: atomcode:glm-5.2
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 47f0b34f6b upstream.
set_ntacl_dacl() copies each ACE from the attacker-controlled stored
security descriptor verbatim into the response DACL without checking
sid.num_subauth. The ACE bytes (including an unchecked num_subauth)
originate from an authenticated SMB2_SET_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) that is
stored raw via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr(); parse_dacl() rejects a bad ACE
with `break` rather than an error, so parse_sec_desc() still returns
success and the malformed SD reaches the xattr intact.
On a subsequent SMB2_QUERY_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) for an inode carrying a
POSIX access ACL, build_sec_desc() -> set_ntacl_dacl() ->
set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() walks the copied ACEs and reads
ntace->sid.sub_auth[ntace->sid.num_subauth - 1]
with num_subauth taken straight from the stored SD. Since sub_auth[]
is fixed at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES (15), a crafted num_subauth (e.g.
255) drives an out-of-bounds heap read of ~1 KB with an offset fully
controlled by an authenticated client.
The sibling functions already gate this field:
parse_dacl() -- num_subauth == 0 || > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
parse_sid() -- num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
smb_copy_sid() -- min_t(u8, num_subauth, SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES)
set_ntacl_dacl() is the lone inconsistent path that omits the check.
Add the same num_subauth validation in set_ntacl_dacl() before copying
the ACE, matching the gate already enforced by parse_dacl().
Signed-off-by: Haofeng Li <lihaofeng@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn>
Suggested-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 432a9b2780 upstream.
ub->completion is only re-armed by a successful START_USER_RECOVERY. If
the ublk server sends END_USER_RECOVERY without one - e.g. its START
failed with -EBUSY and the error was ignored - the wait is satisfied by
the stale completion of the previous recovery cycle, and the device is
marked LIVE and the requeue list kicked while the FETCH stream is still
running and ubq->canceling is still set. The kick redispatches a
previously requeued request, __ublk_queue_rq_common() sees ->canceling
and parks it again via __ublk_abort_rq(), and after the last FETCH
clears ->canceling nothing ever kicks the requeue list again: the
request is stranded there while holding its tag. If it is the flush
machinery's flush_rq, every subsequent fsync piles up in uninterruptible
sleep and teardown hangs on tag draining. This matches a report of a
lost PREFLUSH with ext4 on top of ublk after daemon crash recovery.
ub->completion is an edge-triggered latch used as a proxy for the level
condition "every queue has fetched all I/O commands", which can regress
(F_BATCH's UNPREP, daemon death) and whose re-arm can be skipped. Drop
it and wait on the real condition instead: the new helper
ublk_wait_dev_ready_and_lock() waits on ublk_dev_ready() via
wait_var_event_interruptible(), woken from ublk_mark_io_ready(), then
re-checks it under ub->mutex, waiting again on regression, and returns
with the mutex held and readiness guaranteed.
Readiness becomes true in the same ub->mutex critical section that
clears the last queue's ->canceling, so END_USER_RECOVERY marks the
device LIVE and kicks the requeue list strictly after ->canceling
clears. The wait stays interruptible, so a server whose daemon died can
still be signalled out. For ublk_ctrl_start_dev() this replaces the
fail-fast -EINVAL on an F_BATCH ready->UNPREP regression with waiting
until the device is ready again.
Reported-by: George Salisbury <gsalisbury@apnic.net>
Fixes: 728cbac5fe ("ublk: move device reset into ublk_ch_release()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <tom.leiming@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260719134540.120269-1-tom.leiming@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
[ 6.18.y tracks readiness per fetched I/O command in ->nr_io_ready rather
than per queue in ->nr_queue_ready, so wait and wake on that counter;
->canceling is cleared by ublk_reset_io_flags(), which stays in
ublk_mark_io_ready(). UBLK_F_BATCH_IO does not exist here, so
ublk_ctrl_start_dev() has no F_BATCH readiness re-check to replace, and
readiness can only regress via ublk_reset_ch_dev() on daemon death. ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 4d58d7535e upstream.
Add validation in xe_vm_bind_ioctl() to reject PAT indices
with XE_COH_NONE coherency mode when used with
DRM_XE_VM_BIND_FLAG_CPU_ADDR_MIRROR.
CPU address mirror mappings use system memory that is CPU
cached, which makes them incompatible with COH_NONE PAT
indices. Allowing COH_NONE with CPU cached buffers is a
security risk, as the GPU may bypass CPU caches and read
stale sensitive data from DRAM.
Although CPU_ADDR_MIRROR does not create an immediate
mapping, the backing system memory is still CPU cached.
Apply the same PAT coherency restrictions as
DRM_XE_VM_BIND_OP_MAP_USERPTR.
v2:
- Correct fix tag
v6:
- No change
v7:
- Correct fix tag
v8:
- Rebase
v9:
- Limit the restrictions to iGPU
v10:
- Just add the iGPU logic but keep dGPU logic
Fixes: b43e864af0 ("drm/xe/uapi: Add DRM_XE_VM_BIND_FLAG_CPU_ADDR_MIRROR")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.15+
Cc: Shuicheng Lin <shuicheng.lin@intel.com>
Cc: Mathew Alwin <alwin.mathew@intel.com>
Cc: Michal Mrozek <michal.mrozek@intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jia Yao <jia.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com>
Acked-by: Michal Mrozek <michal.mrozek@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260417055917.2027459-3-jia.yao@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 31d6e6c0ba upstream.
There's a buffer overflow in dm-verity-fec:
if (neras && *neras <= v->fec->roots)
fio->erasures[(*neras)++] = i;
This allows *neras to reach roots + 1 (the post-increment pushes it past
roots). This value is then passed as no_eras to decode_rs8(). Inside the
RS decoder (lib/reed_solomon/decode_rs.c:113-121), the erasure locator
polynomial loop writes lambda[j] where j can reach nroots + 1 — one
element past the end of lambda[] (which is sized nroots + 1, valid
indices 0..nroots). The out-of-bounds write lands on syn[0], corrupting
the syndrome buffer.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a739ff3f54 ("dm verity: add support for forward error correction")
Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 82fbd6a3e2 upstream.
Every time DM_VERITY_FEC_{MAX,MIN}_RSN are used, they are subtracted
from DM_VERITY_FEC_RSM to get the bounds on the number of roots.
Therefore, replace these with {MIN,MAX}_ROOTS constants which are more
directly useful. (Note the inversion, where MAX_RSN maps to MIN_ROOTS
and MIN_RSN maps to MAX_ROOTS.) No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 430a05cb92 upstream.
fec_decode_bufs() assumes that the parity bytes of the first RS codeword
it decodes are never split across parity blocks.
This assumption is false. Consider v->fec->block_size == 4096 &&
v->fec->roots == 17 && fio->nbufs == 1, for example. In that case, each
call to fec_decode_bufs() consumes v->fec->roots * (fio->nbufs <<
DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_RS_BITS) = 272 parity bytes.
Considering that the parity data for each message block starts on a
block boundary, the byte alignment in the parity data will iterate
through 272*i mod 4096 until the 3 parity blocks have been consumed. On
the 16th call (i=15), the alignment will be 4080 bytes into the first
block. Only 16 bytes remain in that block, but 17 parity bytes will be
needed. The code reads out-of-bounds from the parity block buffer.
Fortunately this doesn't normally happen, since it can occur only for
certain non-default values of fec_roots *and* when the maximum number of
buffers couldn't be allocated due to low memory. For example with
block_size=4096 only the following cases are affected:
fec_roots=17: nbufs in [1, 3, 5, 15]
fec_roots=19: nbufs in [1, 229]
fec_roots=21: nbufs in [1, 3, 5, 13, 15, 39, 65, 195]
fec_roots=23: nbufs in [1, 89]
Regardless, fix it by refactoring how the parity blocks are read.
Fixes: 6df90c02ba ("dm-verity FEC: Fix RS FEC repair for roots unaligned to block size (take 2)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit a7fca324d7 upstream.
At most 25 entries in dm_verity_fec_io::erasures are used: the maximum
number of FEC roots plus one. Therefore, set the array size
accordingly. This reduces the size of dm_verity_fec_io by 912 bytes.
Note: a later commit introduces a constant DM_VERITY_FEC_MAX_ROOTS,
which allows the size to be more clearly expressed as
DM_VERITY_FEC_MAX_ROOTS + 1. This commit just fixes the size first.
Fixes: a739ff3f54 ("dm verity: add support for forward error correction")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 10f86a2a5c ]
When a BPF sock_ops program accesses ctx fields with dst_reg == src_reg,
the SOCK_OPS_GET_SK() and SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() macros fail to zero the
destination register in the !fullsock / !locked_tcp_sock path.
Both macros borrow a temporary register to check is_fullsock /
is_locked_tcp_sock when dst_reg == src_reg, because dst_reg holds the
ctx pointer. When the check is false (e.g., TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV state with
a request_sock), dst_reg should be zeroed but is not, leaving the stale
ctx pointer:
- SOCK_OPS_GET_SK: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer, passes NULL checks
as PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, and can be used as a bogus socket pointer,
leading to stack-out-of-bounds access in helpers like
bpf_skc_to_tcp6_sock().
- SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD: dst_reg retains the ctx pointer which the
verifier believes is a SCALAR_VALUE, leaking a kernel pointer.
Fix both macros by:
- Changing JMP_A(1) to JMP_A(2) in the fullsock path to skip the
added instruction.
- Adding BPF_MOV64_IMM(si->dst_reg, 0) after the temp register
restore in the !fullsock path, placed after the restore because
dst_reg == src_reg means we need src_reg intact to read ctx->temp.
Fixes: fd09af0107 ("bpf: sock_ops ctx access may stomp registers in corner case")
Fixes: 84f44df664 ("bpf: sock_ops sk access may stomp registers when dst_reg = src_reg")
Reported-by: Quan Sun <2022090917019@std.uestc.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Yinhao Hu <dddddd@hust.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210@hust.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Dongliang Mu <dzm91@hust.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/6fe1243e-149b-4d3b-99c7-fcc9e2f75787@std.uestc.edu.cn/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260407022720.162151-2-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jay Wang <wanjay@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 220f22e1d6 upstream.
SMU13 reports SocketPowerLimitAc/Dc as the default power limit, but
MsgLimits.Power may carry a different firmware bound for the same PPT
throttler. Using only the socket limit for both min and max can therefore
expose an incorrect power range.
Keep the socket limit as the default, but derive the range from both values:
use the lower value for the min base and the higher value for the max base
before applying OD percentages. Keep the current limit query independent
from the cap calculation.
Fixes: 1eaf26db95 ("drm/amd/pm: fix smu13 power limit default/cap calculation")
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/work_items/5419
Signed-off-by: Yang Wang <kevinyang.wang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Feng <kenneth.feng@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit f45bbf0f62)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ea772a440d upstream.
amdgpu_pci_remove() calls drm_dev_unplug() before invoking the driver
fini routines. This causes drm_dev_enter() in amdgpu_ttm_fini() to
always return false, so iounmap(aper_base_kaddr) never runs on normal
driver unload, leaving an orphaned entry in the x86 PAT interval tree.
On connected_to_cpu hardware, the aperture is mapped write-back (WB) via
ioremap_cache(). On reload, IP discovery calls memremap(..., MEMREMAP_WC)
over the same range. The WC vs WB conflict causes:
ioremap error for 0x..., requested 0x1, got 0x0
amdgpu: discovery failed: -2
Fix by switching to devres-managed mappings so cleanup is guaranteed
regardless of drm_dev_enter() state:
- connected_to_cpu path: devm_memremap(MEMREMAP_WB). For
IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM ranges this takes the try_ram_remap() shortcut,
returning __va(offset) from the existing kernel direct map. No new
ioremap VA or PAT entry is created, so there is nothing to orphan.
- dGPU path: devm_ioremap_wc() registers iounmap() as a devres action,
guaranteeing cleanup at device_del() time.
Also remove iounmap(aper_base_kaddr) from amdgpu_device_unmap_mmio()
since the mapping is now devres-owned.
v2: Remove redundant x86_64 guard (Lijo)
Fixes: 9d0af8b4de ("drm/amdgpu: pre-map device buffer as cached for A+A config")
Signed-off-by: Asad Kamal <asad.kamal@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Lijo Lazar <lijo.lazar@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit d871e99879)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 020da7c5aa upstream.
When ACP soft reset poll times out, original code returns early without cleanup,
leaking MFD child devices, genpd links and all ACP heap allocations.
Replace direct early return with goto out to force run all cleanup logic
regardless of reset success, preserve timeout error code for caller.
Signed-off-by: Ce Sun <cesun102@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tao Zhou <tao.zhou1@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 98073e4328)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0c01c811be upstream.
When width or height is less than 16, width_in_mb or height_in_mb
becomes 0, leading to fs_in_mb being 0. This causes a division by
zero when calculating num_dpb_buffer in H264 and H264 Perf decode
paths.
Add validation to reject frames with width < 16 or height < 16
before performing any calculations that depend on these values.
V2: Format change - move up all vaiable definitions.
V3: Use warn_once to avoid spam.
Signed-off-by: Boyuan Zhang <boyuan.zhang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Leo Liu <leo.liu@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3e41d26c70)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6130598759 upstream.
A hotplug or link-loss event can tear down the MST topology
(setting mgr->mst_state = false and mgr->mst_primary = NULL) concurrently
with a caller invoking drm_dp_mst_topology_queue_probe(). Since the check
is already performed under mgr->lock, the condition is not a programming
error but a valid race -- the topology was valid when the caller decided
to call this function, but was torn down before the lock was acquired.
Replace the drm_WARN_ON() with a graceful early return. This eliminates
spurious kernel warnings and the resulting compositor crashes observed
when connecting/disconnecting DP MST monitors, while keeping the correct
behavior of doing nothing when MST is not active. A drm_dbg_mst() trace
is added so the skipped probe remains observable under MST debug logging.
The existing WARN_ON(mgr->mst_primary) in drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst()
already catches the case where the topology is initialized twice, so no
diagnostic coverage is lost.
Fixes: dbaeef363e ("drm/dp_mst: Add a helper to queue a topology probe")
Cc: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com>
Cc: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Signed-off-by: Jonas Emilsson <jonas.emilsson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260503034533.1023686-1-jonas.emilsson@gmail.com
Acked-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260622140532.526722-1-luciano.coelho@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <dev@lankhorst.se>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 186bfdc4e2 upstream.
Fix a security vulnerability where malicious VCE command streams
with oversized dimensions (e.g. 65536×65536) cause 32-bit integer
overflow, wrapping the calculated buffer size to 0. This bypasses
validation and allows GPU firmware to perform out-of-bound memory
access.
The fix uses 64-bit arithmetic to detect overflow and rejects
invalid dimensions before they reach the hardware.
V2: remove redundant check
V3: modify max height value
V4: remove size64
Signed-off-by: Boyuan Zhang <boyuan.zhang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit cbe408dba5)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit aff079bdce upstream.
For SOC24 ASICs (RDNA4 / Navi 4x dGPUs) re-enabling PM features fails if an
S3 suspend got aborted, the same issue already handled for SOC21 and SOC15:
commit df3c7dc5c5 ("drm/amdgpu: Reset dGPU if suspend got aborted")
commit 38e8ca3e4b ("amdgpu/soc15: enable asic reset for dGPU in case of suspend abort")
The aborted resume fails with:
amdgpu: SMU: No response msg_reg: 6 resp_reg: 0
amdgpu: Failed to enable requested dpm features!
amdgpu: resume of IP block <smu> failed -62
Apply the same workaround for soc24: detect the aborted-suspend state at
resume via the sign-of-life register and reset the device before re-init.
This is a workaround till a proper solution is finalized.
Fixes: 98b912c50e ("drm/amdgpu: Add soc24 common ip block (v2)")
Signed-off-by: Jakob Linke <jakob@linke.cx>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit fed5bdbfe1)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit efcedeecec upstream.
jpeg_v5_0_1_is_idle() initializes ret to false and then accumulates ring
idle status using &=. Since false & condition always remains false, the
function can never report the JPEG block as idle.
Initialize ret to true so the function returns true only when all JPEG
rings report RB_JOB_DONE.
Signed-off-by: Boyuan Zhang <boyuan.zhang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: David (Ming Qiang) Wu <David.Wu3@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 680adf5fae)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c44af3810f upstream.
jpeg_v4_0_3_is_idle() initializes ret to false and then accumulates ring
idle status using &=. Since false & condition always remains false, the
function can never report the JPEG block as idle.
Initialize ret to true so the function returns true only when all JPEG
rings report RB_JOB_DONE.
Signed-off-by: Boyuan Zhang <boyuan.zhang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit e9df8e9d04)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 238baca26a upstream.
amdgpu_pm_info displayed power sensor readings with the wrong fractional unit.
It treated the low byte of the raw sensor value as the decimal part of watts,
while that field represents milliwatts in the decoded value. As a result,
debugfs could report misleading SoC power when the remainder was not already
a two-digit centiwatt value.
Example with query = 0x00000354:
raw field value
---------------------
query >> 8 3 W
query & 0xff 84 mW
decoded power 3084 mW
output value
---------------------
before 3.84 W
after 3.08 W
Fixes: f0b8f65b48 ("drm/amd/amdgpu: fix the GPU power print error in pm info")
Signed-off-by: Yang Wang <kevinyang.wang@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Asad Kamal <asad.kamal@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 01992b121f)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2b37415618 upstream.
The s32g_wdt driver uses two incorrect constants in the options field
of its watchdog_info struct. This bit mask should contain WDIOF_*
constants, but the driver uses two WDIOC_* ioctl constants (in addition
to correct WDIOF_* constants). This causes many incorrect bits to be
set in the bit mask. The functionality indicated by these ioctl
constants is supported by all drivers using the watchdog framework, so
this patch simply removes them.
Fixes: bd3f54ec55 ("watchdog: Add the Watchdog Timer for the NXP S32 platform")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.18+
Signed-off-by: Ethan Nelson-Moore <enelsonmoore@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260505024409.60301-1-enelsonmoore@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dcd9b46596 upstream.
When replacing the source list of an MDB remote entry, all existing
sources are first marked for deletion and vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_add()
is then called to add the new source list. Sources present in the new
list have their deletion mark cleared, and any sources left marked
afterwards are removed.
If vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_add() fails partway through, its error path
deletes all entries on the remote's source list. That rollback is only
correct for its other caller, vxlan_mdb_remote_add(), where the remote
was just allocated and the list contains solely entries added during
the call. On the replace path the list also holds pre-existing sources,
so a failed replace tears them down together with their (S, G)
forwarding entries instead of leaving the entry unchanged.
This is reachable from an existing (*, G) remote. An EXCLUDE filter
that loses sources starts forwarding traffic that should be blocked,
while an INCLUDE filter that loses sources drops traffic that should be
forwarded.
Mark entries created during the current pass with a new
VXLAN_SGRP_F_NEW flag. On failure, delete only those entries and clear
the deletion mark on the pre-existing ones, so a failed replace leaves
the source list untouched. Retain the flag until the whole operation
succeeds and then clear it. Also stop vxlan_mdb_remote_src_add() from
deleting a pre-existing entry it only looked up when adding that
entry's forwarding entry fails.
Fixes: a3a48de5ea ("vxlan: mdb: Add MDB control path support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Raphael Tiovalen <jamestiotio@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260720160428.249356-1-jamestiotio@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2a12c05aef upstream.
When many small packets accumulate in the receive queue, the skb overhead
can exceed buf_alloc even while the payload is within bounds. This causes
virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt() to reject packets, leading to connection
resets during large transfers under backpressure.
The issue was reported by Brien, who has a reproducer, but it is also
easily reproducible with iperf-vsock [1] using a small packet size:
iperf3 --vsock -c $CID -l 129
which fails immediately without this patch but with commit 059b7dbd20
("vsock/virtio: fix potential unbounded skb queue").
Inspired by TCP's tcp_collapse() which solves a similar problem, add
virtio_transport_collapse_rx_queue() that walks the receive queue and
re-copies data into compact linear skbs to reduce the overhead.
The collapse is triggered proactively from when the number of skb queued
is close to exceeding the overhead budget.
A pre-scan counts the eligible bytes to size each allocation precisely,
avoiding waste for isolated small packets. Partially consumed skbs are
kept as-is to preserve buf_used/fwd_cnt accounting, EOM-marked skbs to
maintain SEQPACKET message boundaries, and skbs already larger than the
collapse target because they already have a good data-to-overhead ratio.
Walking a large queue may take a significant amount of time and cache
misses, causing traffic burstiness. To limit this, the collapse stops
once enough room is freed for this packet and the next one, but may
opportunistically free more to fill each collapsed skb to capacity.
[1] https://github.com/stefano-garzarella/iperf-vsock
Fixes: 059b7dbd20 ("vsock/virtio: fix potential unbounded skb queue")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Brien Oberstein <brienpub@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/618701dd023e$063de350$12b9a9f0$@gmail.com/
Tested-by: Brien Oberstein <brienpub@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bobby Eshleman <bobbyeshleman@meta.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260708102904.50732-2-sgarzare@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ba0533fc16 upstream.
When tipc_sk_create() fails to insert the new socket (tipc_sk_insert()
returns non-zero), its error path frees the sk with sk_free() but leaves
sock->sk pointing at the freed object:
if (tipc_sk_insert(tsk)) {
sk_free(sk);
pr_warn("Socket create failed; port number exhausted\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
This is harmless for plain socket(): the syscall layer clears sock->ops
before releasing, so tipc_release() is never called. It is not harmless
on the accept() path. tipc_accept() creates the pre-allocated child
socket with tipc_sk_create(net, new_sock, 0, kern); on failure it leaves
new_sock->sk dangling and new_sock->ops non-NULL, and do_accept() then
fput()s the new file, so __sock_release() -> tipc_release() runs
lock_sock(new_sock->sk) on the freed sk -- a use-after-free write of the
sk_lock spinlock.
tipc_release() already guards this exact "failed accept() releases a
pre-allocated child" case with "if (sk == NULL) return 0;", but the
guard is bypassed because tipc_sk_create() left sock->sk non-NULL
(dangling) rather than NULL.
Clear sock->sk on the failed-insert path so the existing tipc_release()
NULL check fires and the use-after-free is avoided.
The tipc_sk_insert() failure is reached when the per-netns socket
rhashtable hits its max_size (tsk_rht_params.max_size = 1048576, ~2M
elements) -- i.e. once a netns holds ~2M TIPC sockets every insert
returns -E2BIG.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_sock_nested (net/core/sock.c:3839)
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880047cdc38 by task init/1
lock_sock_nested (net/core/sock.c:3839)
tipc_release (net/tipc/socket.c:638)
__sock_release (net/socket.c:710)
sock_close (net/socket.c:1501)
__fput (fs/file_table.c:512)
Allocated by task 1:
sk_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2308)
tipc_sk_create (net/tipc/socket.c:487)
tipc_accept (net/tipc/socket.c:2744)
do_accept (net/socket.c:2034)
Freed by task 1:
__sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2391)
tipc_sk_create (net/tipc/socket.c:504)
tipc_accept (net/tipc/socket.c:2744)
do_accept (net/socket.c:2034)
Fixes: 00aff3590f ("net: tipc: fix possible refcount leak in tipc_sk_create()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.quang.nguyen@est.tech>
Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Daehyeon Ko <4ncienth@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714131939.1255974-1-4ncienth@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a28c4fcbf7 upstream.
The SYN-RECEIVED request-socket path in tcp_check_req() accepts an
in-window RST without requiring SEG.SEQ to exactly match RCV.NXT. A
non-exact RST therefore removes the request instead of eliciting a
challenge ACK.
RFC 9293 section 3.10.7.4 applies the RFC 5961 reset check in
SYN-RECEIVED: an exact RST resets the connection, while a non-exact
in-window RST must trigger a challenge ACK and be dropped.
Apply that check before the ACK-field validation, following the RFC
sequence-number, RST, then ACK processing order. Factor the per-netns
challenge ACK quota out of tcp_send_challenge_ack() so request sockets
can share it. Use the request socket's send_ack() callback and its own
out-of-window ACK timestamp to send and rate-limit the response.
Reported-by: Yuxiang Yang <yangyx22@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Yizhou Zhao <zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Ao Wang <wangao@seu.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Xuewei Feng <fengxw06@126.com>
Reported-by: Qi Li <qli01@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Ke Xu <xuke@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Fixes: 282f23c6ee ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Yuxiang Yang <yangyx22@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260717081443.809393-2-yangyx22@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e1a9d3cc11 upstream.
tcp_v4_send_ack() and tcp_v6_send_response() construct standalone TCP
responses with TCP-AO options. The option length carries the actual MAC
length, but the TCP header length includes the option rounded up to a
four-byte boundary.
tcp_ao_hash_hdr() writes the MAC only. Thus, when the MAC length is not
four-byte aligned, the one to three bytes after the MAC are left
uninitialized and may be transmitted. For the normal TCP-AO hashing
mode, those bytes also have to be initialized before computing the MAC.
Initialize only the alignment padding in the TCP-AO branches, before
hashing the header. Use TCPOPT_NOP, as in the normal TCP-AO output path.
This avoids adding work to non-AO TCP responses while preserving a valid
authenticated header.
Fixes: decde2586b ("net/tcp: Add TCP-AO sign to twsk")
Fixes: da7dfaa6d6 ("net/tcp: Consistently align TCP-AO option in the header")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yizhou Zhao <zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Yuxiang Yang <yangyx22@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Ao Wang <wangao@seu.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Xuewei Feng <fengxw06@126.com>
Reported-by: Qi Li <qli01@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Ke Xu <xuke@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yizhou Zhao <zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260713105631.8616-1-zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1c50efa1fa upstream.
The hardware performs packet parsing before packet transmission.
Parsing incomplete IPv4, IPv6, TCP, or UDP headers may trigger a TX
hang because the hardware parser expects additional protocol header
data that is not present in the packet.
The hardware performs additional PTP parsing on UDP packets identified
by destination ports 319/320 at the expected UDP destination port
offset.
If such a packet has transport data smaller than RTASE_MIN_PAD_LEN,
the hardware parser expects additional packet data and may trigger a
TX hang.
To avoid these hardware issues, the driver applies the following
workarounds.
Drop malformed packets that may trigger this hardware issue before
transmission.
For IPv4 non-initial fragments, the hardware does not check the
fragment offset before parsing the expected transport header location.
As a result, these packets are still subject to transport header
parsing even though they do not contain a transport header. If the
transport data is shorter than the minimum transport header required
by the hardware parser, pad the transport data to the minimum
transport header length required by the hardware parser. Packets that
also match the hardware PTP parsing conditions continue to follow the
corresponding workaround.
For IPv6 fragmented packets, neither of the above hardware issues
occurs because the hardware only continues packet parsing when the
IPv6 Base Header Next Header field directly indicates UDP. Packets
carrying a Fragment Header do not continue through the subsequent
packet parsing stages.
For packets identified for hardware PTP parsing, pad the transport
data so it reaches RTASE_MIN_PAD_LEN before transmission.
Fixes: d6e882b89f ("rtase: Implement .ndo_start_xmit function")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Justin Lai <justinlai0215@realtek.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260709103456.83789-1-justinlai0215@realtek.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e9c238f6fe upstream.
pppoe_sendmsg() saves a pointer to the PPPoE header before calling
dev_hard_header(). Device header callbacks are allowed to reallocate the
skb head, invalidating pointers into it.
This can happen when a send is blocked in copy_from_user() while the first
non-Ethernet port is added to an empty team device. The team's delegated
GRE header callback then expands the skb head. PPPoE subsequently writes
six bytes through the stale pointer into the freed head.
Reload the PPPoE header through the skb's network-header offset after
device header creation. pskb_expand_head() updates that offset when it
relocates the head.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada <manizada@pm.me>
Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260722093814.3017176-1-manizada@pm.me
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a4710ae2e7 upstream.
ovpn_peer_keepalive_send() passes its peer reference to
ovpn_xmit_special(), which ultimately drops it. The keepalive scheduler
currently queues the work first and takes the reference only after
schedule_work() reports that the work was queued.
Once schedule_work() queues the item, another CPU may run the worker
before the caller gets to ovpn_peer_hold(). In that case the worker can
consume a reference that was not acquired for it, corrupting the peer
lifetime accounting.
Take the peer reference before queueing the work and drop it again when
the work was already pending.
Fixes: 3ecfd9349f ("ovpn: implement keepalive mechanism")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Shuvam Pandey <shuvampandey1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <antonio@openvpn.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 63bbe18fc0 upstream.
When either the TCP RX or TX error path calls ovpn_peer_hold() followed
by schedule_work(&peer->tcp.defer_del_work), and the work item is already
pending from the other path, schedule_work() returns false and the work
runs only once. Since ovpn_tcp_peer_del_work() calls ovpn_peer_put()
exactly once, the extra reference taken by the losing path is never
dropped, leaking the peer object.
The race window:
CPU0 (strparser/RX error): CPU1 (tcp_tx_work/TX error):
ovpn_peer_hold() <- refcnt+1 ovpn_peer_hold() <- refcnt+2
schedule_work() <- queued schedule_work() <- NO-OP
(work already pending)
ovpn_tcp_peer_del_work runs:
ovpn_peer_del()
ovpn_peer_put() <- refcnt+1
<- peer never freed
Fix by checking the return value of schedule_work() in both paths and
calling ovpn_peer_put() to drop the extra reference if the work was
already pending. ovpn_peer_hold() is kept unconditional in the TX path
as it cannot fail at that point.
Fixes: a6a5e87b3e ("ovpn: avoid sleep in atomic context in TCP RX error path")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <antonio@openvpn.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4032f8ed10 upstream.
OVS_ACTION_ATTR_TRUNC currently stores a delta from the original skb
length in OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen. When a later userspace action segments a
GSO skb, queue_gso_packets() reuses that delta for each smaller segment.
A segment can then reach queue_userspace_packet() with cutlen greater
than skb->len, underflowing the length passed to skb_zerocopy().
Store the maximum preserved length instead and bound each consumer
against the current skb length. Use U32_MAX as the no-truncation
sentinel so the value remains valid if skb geometry changes before a
consumer handles it.
Fixes: f2a4d086ed ("openvswitch: Add packet truncation support.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260707221635.27489-1-kylebot@openai.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 793b9b729f upstream.
The MCTP serial receive state machine reads a frame length byte in
mctp_serial_push_header() case 2 and validates it upper-bound-only:
if (c > MCTP_SERIAL_FRAME_MTU) {
dev->rxstate = STATE_ERR;
} else {
dev->rxlen = c;
dev->rxpos = 0;
dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA;
...
}
A length of zero passes this check, so rxlen is set to 0 and the state
machine advances to STATE_DATA. In mctp_serial_push() STATE_DATA, the
incoming byte is stored and rxpos incremented before the terminator is
tested:
dev->rxbuf[dev->rxpos] = c;
dev->rxpos++;
dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA;
if (dev->rxpos == dev->rxlen) {
dev->rxpos = 0;
dev->rxstate = STATE_TRAILER;
}
With rxlen == 0 the "rxpos == rxlen" terminator can never fire (rxpos is
already 1 on the first data byte), so subsequent bytes are written past
the end of the fixed 74-byte rxbuf, which is the last member of the
netdev private area. Every following data byte is an attacker-controlled
1-byte out-of-bounds heap write, and the overflow continues until a
frame (0x7e) or escape byte resets the parser -- effectively unbounded.
Reaching this requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach the N_MCTP line
discipline and bring the resulting mctpserialN netdev up, after which
the bytes arrive via the tty receive path.
Route a zero-length frame straight to STATE_TRAILER instead of
STATE_DATA. The trailer/framing bytes are still consumed, and the frame
resolves to a zero-length skb that the MCTP core rejects; the parser
never enters STATE_DATA with rxlen == 0, so the out-of-bounds write can
no longer occur.
KASAN, on a frame of 0x7e 0x01 0x00 followed by data bytes (before this
change):
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c:370
index 74 is out of range for type 'u8 [74]'
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf
Write of size 1 at addr ... by task kworker/u16:0
mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf
tty_ldisc_receive_buf
flush_to_ldisc
Allocated by task 152:
alloc_netdev_mqs
mctp_serial_open
v2: route zero-length frames to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_ERR so
the trailer/framing bytes are still consumed (Jeremy Kerr).
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
Fixes: a0c2ccd9b5 ("mctp: Add MCTP-over-serial transport binding")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Jeremy Kerr <jk@codeconstruct.com.au>
Assisted-by: 0sec:multi-model
Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260715082021.46315-1-doruk@0sec.ai
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fd3a3f28ed upstream.
llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the
AEAD request as
assoclen += datalen - authlen;
where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen
(4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies
that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A
secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes
datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to
aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so
crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that
only spans the real frame.
The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any
IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is
shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction.
Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault
in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed.
Fixes: 4c14a2fb5d ("mac802154: add llsec decryption method")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260716193423.32498-1-doruk@0sec.ai
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 234e5e898b upstream.
mac802154_scan_worker() captures the scanning sub-interface under RCU
and then keeps dereferencing sdata->dev after rcu_read_unlock() and
outside the rtnl -- in the failure traces, in
mac802154_transmit_beacon_req() (skb->dev = sdata->dev), and in the
end_scan cleanup. Nothing keeps that netdev alive across the worker
iteration.
A concurrent DEL_INTERFACE or PHY removal can unregister the interface
once the worker drops the rtnl between its two drv_set_channel()
sections. unregister_netdevice() frees the netdev asynchronously from
netdev_run_todo() with the rtnl already dropped, so neither holding the
rtnl nor the per-PHY IEEE802154_IS_SCANNING flag prevents a stale worker
iteration from dereferencing the freed netdev -- a KASAN
slab-use-after-free, reachable by racing TRIGGER_SCAN against
DEL_INTERFACE (both CAP_NET_ADMIN).
Pin the netdev with netdev_hold() while the RCU read lock is still held,
and release it at every worker exit.
Fixes: 57588c7117 ("mac802154: Handle passive scanning")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260721211228.34578-1-security@auditcode.ai
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 92d3817649 upstream.
ila_csum_adjust_transport() caches ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb) before calling
pskb_may_pull(). On a non-linear skb whose transport header sits in a page
fragment, pskb_may_pull() can call __pskb_pull_tail() / pskb_expand_head()
and free the old skb head, leaving ip6h dangling; the following
get_csum_diff(ip6h, p) then reads freed memory. ila_update_ipv6_locator()
uses ip6h (and the iaddr derived from it) again after the csum-adjust
call and additionally writes the new locator through that pointer.
Impact: a remote IPv6 packet routed through a configured ILA
csum-adjust-transport route or receive-side mapping triggers a
slab-use-after-free in ila_update_ipv6_locator() (KASAN). The route or
mapping requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to configure, but trigger packets are
unauthenticated once it exists.
Reload ip6h after each pskb_may_pull() in ila_csum_adjust_transport()
before the csum-diff read. In ila_update_ipv6_locator() only the
ILA_CSUM_ADJUST_TRANSPORT case pulls the skb, so reload ip6h and iaddr in
that case alone before the destination-address write; the neutral-map
modes never pull and keep their cached pointers.
Fixes: 33f11d1614 ("ila: Create net/ipv6/ila directory")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714114903.3763420-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Harry Wentland
Eric Biggers
Namjae Jeon
Wentao Guan
Haofeng Li
Youssef Samir
Ming Lei
Jia Yao
Mikulas Patocka
Jiayuan Chen
Christian König
Yang Wang
Asad Kamal
Ce Sun
Boyuan Zhang
Luca Coelho
Jakob Linke
Alex Deucher
Ethan Nelson-Moore
James Raphael Tiovalen
Stefano Garzarella
Daehyeon Ko
Yuxiang Yang
Yizhou Zhao
Justin Lai
Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada
Shuvam Pandey
Pavitra Jha
Kyle Zeng
Doruk Tan Ozturk
Ibrahim Hashimov
Michael Bommarito